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ABSTRACT 
This thesis project examines the collective memory of Katyń from the midst of the 
Second World War to the late twentieth century. Katyń serves as the collective name for the 
series of mass executions of over 20,000 Polish soldiers, army officers, policemen, and various 
members of the Polish intelligentsia by the NKVD that took place throughout remote sites in the 
Soviet Union during the early months of the Second World War. From the discovery of the mass 
graves in the Katyń Forest by German forces in 1943, Katyń has been shrouded in contentions, 
secrecy, and processes of attempts to unveil the historical truth of the perpetrators of the mass 
executions. For nearly five decades, many scholars of Katyń argue that the “truth” of the mass 
executions remained hidden. While this claim is not entirely incorrect as the Soviet and Polish 
states’ sponsored versions of the truth of the crime’s perpetrators appeared “hidden,” this school 
of thought is disingenuous and problematic in its approach in examining contemporaries’ 
understanding and perceptions of Katyń throughout the latter portion of the twentieth century.  
This thesis project argues that to better understand what Katyń was and has been, we must 
examine the representations of Katyń from the discovery of the mass graves by German forces in 
the Katyń Forest in 1943 to the release of Katyń documents by the Soviet Union in 1990. This 
thesis project examines selected representations of Katyń made by the German and Soviet 
governments during the Second World War, Polish émigrés living within the United States and 
Great Britain during the post-war period, and Poles living within the Polska Rzeczpospolita 
Ludowa (PRL) and present-day Poland. Katyń has represented a myriad of meanings in the 
collective memories of states and societies throughout time. The understanding, representations, 
“truth,” and narratives surrounding Katyń have undoubtedly been influenced by the politics of 
memory at every stage of the Katyń story. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Katyń 
In present-day Polish collective memory, the Second World War is regarded as the most 
traumatic event in modern Polish history.1 Poland experienced catastrophic loss, devastation, 
mass death, and suffering as a result of the Second World War.  Throughout the near six-year 
German and Soviet occupations of the country, over six million Poles were killed, either as a 
direct initiative committed by occupying forces or as a result of warfare. During the Nazi state 
sponsored genocide known as the Holocaust, approximately three million Jewish Poles, ninety 
percent of the pre-war Jewish population, were murdered in ghettos, concentration camps, and 
forced marches throughout the occupied territory and greater Europe. Seven to eight percent of 
non-Jewish Poles were also murdered during ethnic cleansing initiatives perpetrated by the Nazi 
state.2 The country experienced extensive material destruction to cities: the Polish capital of 
Warsaw was razed to the ground following the Warsaw Uprising in 1944.3  
The First World War ended the century long partition of Poland. Its conclusion enabled 
the emergence of an independent Polish state. The commencement of the Second World War 
resulted in the partition of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union, and the devastating 
loss of millions of Polish citizens’ lives.  At the end of the Second World War, the People’s 
Republic of Poland (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, hereafter the PRL) emerged as an 
                                                          
1 Andrzej Paczkowski. “The Second World War in Present-Day Polish Memory and Politics,” in The Long 
Aftermath: Cultural Legacies of Europe at War, 1936-2016. New York: Berghahn Books. 2016, 277. 
2 Paczkowski. “The Second World War in Present-Day Polish Memory and Politics,” 277. 
3 Ibid.  
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autonomous, non-democratic state aligned with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 
While the PRL was under the powerful sway of the USSR throughout the Cold War period, the 
government of the PRL maintained its own internal affairs and national borders. Following the 
collapse of the PRL and the USSR in the early 1990s, an independent, democratic Polish state 
emerged as Rzeczpospolita Polska (the Republic of Poland). The effects of the Second World 
War still permeate throughout present-day Polish society. Nearly eighty years after the beginning 
of the Second World War, events from the war remain important attributes of national identity 
making and politics in the Republic of Poland. Events from the war, like the Warsaw Uprising of 
1944, are commemorated in nationwide events of remembrance and commemoration of Polish 
heroism and martyrdom each year. In present-day Polish collective memory, there remains one 
word that immediately signifies immense suffering, anxiety, and loss experienced as a result of 
the Second World War: Katyń. 
Referred to as one of the “greatest blank spots,” in Polish and Soviet histories, Katyń 
serves as the present-day Polish symbol of national suffering, anxiety, and loss experienced 
during Poland’s unsettling twentieth century.4 Katyń serves as the collective name for the series 
of mass executions of over 20,000 Polish soldiers, army officers, policemen, and various 
members of the Polish intelligentsia by the Soviet Union’s People’s Commissariat for Internal 
Affairs (Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, the NKVD hereafter) that took place 
throughout remote sites in the Soviet Union during the early months of the Second World War. 
The series of mass executions that took place from March to June 1940 are collectively known 
                                                          
4 Danielle Drozdzewski, “Knowing (or Not) about Katyń: The Silencing and Surfacing of Public Memory,” 
in The Politics of Hiding, Invisibility, and Silence: Between Absence and Presence. New York and Abingdon, 
Oxon.: Routledge. 2015, 47.  
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under the name of the first discovered site of the executions: the Katyń Forest near Smolensk, 
Russia.5 In April 1943, German forces discovered the mass graves of over four thousand missing 
Polish soldiers, army officers, policemen, and intelligentsia members. Through a communique 
issued on Radio Berlin, German forces alerted the world that the mass graves were discovered in 
the Katyń Forest and those responsible for the executions were Soviet forces. Following the 
announcement of the discovery of these mass graves near Smolensk, Katyń became much more 
than the name for the mass executions of thousands of Polish soldiers, police officers, and 
members of the intelligentsia. From the discovery of the mass graves in the Katyń Forest, Katyń 
has been shrouded in contentions, secrecy, and processes of attempts to unveil the historical truth 
of the perpetrators. Often, attempts to unveil the identity of the perpetrators have been influenced 
by the political and social environments of the historical actors.  
Nearly immediately following the Radio Berlin communique, the Soviet government 
issued their own communique, in which the Soviet government blamed German forces for the 
crime. The Soviet communique would become the basis for the Soviet state’s official narrative 
surrounding the Katyń crime, maintaining the five decade long account that German forces were 
behind the mass executions of the Polish officers. The Soviet government’s narrative 
surrounding Katyń would later become collectively referred to as the “Katyń lie (kłamstwo 
katyńskie),” by Poles living abroad and in the PRL.  
What was the “truth” about Katyń? Scholar Andrzej Przewoźnik notes that from the 
immediate commencement of the mass executions, the crimes were shrouded in deception and 
                                                          
5 Allen Paul. Stalin’s Massacre and the Triumph of Truth. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 2010, 
ix. 
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secrecy fostering great anxiety throughout segments of Polish society.6 For nearly five decades, 
many scholars of Katyń argue that the “truth” remained hidden.7 While this claim is not entirely 
incorrect as the state sponsored versions of the truth of the crime’s perpetrators appeared 
“hidden,” this school of thought is disingenuous and problematic in its approach in examining 
contemporaries’ understanding and perceptions of Katyń throughout the latter portion of the 
twentieth century. Contemporaries, like Polish Military General Władysław Anders, knew that 
the mass graves found in the Katyń Forest included the missing officers taken prisoner by Soviet 
forces from the Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov internment camps in the Soviet Union 
following the Radio Berlin announcement, in which German forces alerted the world about the 
discovery of the mass graves in the Katyń Forest in 1943.  
Utilizing approaches similar to Holocaust scholar and historian Daniel H. Magilow and 
Lisa Silverman respectively, I argue that to better understand what Katyń was and has been, we 
must examine the representations of Katyń from the discovery of the mass graves in the Katyń 
Forest in 1943 to the release of Katyń documents by the Soviet Union in 1990.8 International 
representations and debates about Katyń have contributed to how present day scholars 
understand Katyń. Much of what we now know about Katyń has also been from representations 
                                                          
6 Andrzej Przewoźnik, “The Process of Revealing the Truth and Commemorating the Victims,” in White 
Spots. Black Spots. Difficult Matters in Polish-Russian Relations, 1918-2008. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press. 2015, 211.  
7 For reference, please see works such as Allen Paul’s Katyń: The Untold Story of Stalin’s Polish Massacre. 
New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1991; Katyń: Stalin’s Massacre and the 
Triumph of Truth. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 2010; and George Sanford’s Katyń and the Soviet 
Massacre of 1940. New York: Routledge. 2005. 
8 Daniel H Magilow and Lisa Silverman. Holocaust Representations in History: An Introduction. New 
York and London: Bloomsbury Academic. 2015, 1. 
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made by Polish émigrés and Poles living within the PRL. Like many contested, complex 
historical events, the interpretation of Katyń has never been a “straightforward endeavor.”9 By 
showing the development and process of “truth telling” and memory, we gain invaluable insight 
into the evolved understandings of Katyń by contemporaries from the midst of the Second World 
War to the release of the Katyń documents in 1990 and 1992.  
Between the German and Soviet governments, Katyń became a political bargaining tool 
of propaganda against the perceived enemy during the Second World War and the immediate 
post-war period. Immediately following the discovery of the mass graves near Smolensk, the 
German and Soviet governments blamed one another for the crime through a series of 
communique. For the Allied governments of the United States and Great Britain, Katyń became 
an extremely contentious topic to reckon with (and ultimately avoid) in consideration of the 
advancing war effort in which continued Soviet involvement was key. For ordinary Poles living 
in Poland and for Polish émigrés across the globe, Katyń symbolized a myriad of meanings from 
the Nazi “discovery” of the mass graves in the Katyń Forest in April 1943 to a symbol of protest 
prior to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For 
nearly five decades, the identity of those who executed the Polish officers and the memory of the 
mass executions have been hotly contested among governments, scholars, and ordinary citizens 
alike. 
                                                          
9 I use the term “straightforward endeavor” as a borrowed term from Daniel H Magilow and Lisa 
Silverman’s analysis of contested, complex historical events, like the Holocaust, in their work Holocaust 
Representations in History: An Introduction. New York and London: Bloomsbury Academic. 2015, 1. 
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Following that announcement, the Polish government-in-exile would not accept at face 
value the Soviet government’s claim that German forces were the perpetrators of the crime, 
particularly due to evidence compiled and confirmed by a Soviet representative within the 
USSR. Requests for an independent investigation by the Polish government-in-exile eventually 
led to the severing of diplomatic relations between the Soviet government and the Polish 
government-in-exile by Soviet premiere Josef Stalin in 1943. To understand the processes and 
remaking of truth in relation to Katyń is to understand the driving question of contemporaries’ 
understanding and perceptions of Katyń: who murdered the Polish officers and when the mass 
executions take place? This question remained a dominant inquiry of study by scholars of Katyń 
until the Solidarity period in the late 1970s to early 1980s. In 1990, Soviet premiere Mikhail 
Gorbachev released Soviet documents related to Katyń that confirmed what scholars of Katyń 
had already posited: the perpetrators of the crime were not the German forces, but rather the 
NKVD. In 1992, Russian president Boris Yeltsin released further documentation to Polish 
President Lech Wałęsa that showed Josef Stalin ordered the crime himself. 
Since the release of the Katyń documents in 1990 and 1992, historical truth and the 
reconstruction of the mass executions have been the primary objectives of contributions to the 
English language historiography of Katyń. There have been few contributions to the English 
language historiography and broader scholarship on Katyń examining the collective memory, 
representations of the massacres, and contemporaries’ emotions surrounding the series of mass 
executions which took place between March and June 1940.10 One such contribution, 
                                                          
10 In the English language historiography on Katyń, there are publications like the subsequently referenced 
work Remembering Katyń. In the broader English language scholarship on Katyń, there are publications, such as 
Danielle Drozdzewski’s “Knowing (or Not) about Katyń: The Silencing and Surfacing of Public Memory,” in The 
Politics of Hiding, Invisibility, and Silence: Between Absence and Presence. New York and Abingdon, Oxon.: 
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Remembering Katyn, examines the collective memory of the mass executions of over 20,000 
Polish soldiers through an interconnected memory culture throughout Belarus, Poland, Russia, 
Ukraine, and the Baltic States.11 The contribution is a collaborative collection of essays by noted 
Slavic Studies scholars Alexander Etkind, Rory Finnin, Uilleam Blacker, Julie Fedor, Simon 
Lewis, Maria Mälksoo, and Matilda Mroz.  
 In the first chapter of that work, the authors examine representations of Katyń in 
Poland.12 The authors identify two important categorizations of localities of people in the making 
of the memory and mourning of Katyń: in “Polonia,” the Polish émigré community across the 
world, particularly in the United States and Great Britain, and Polish citizens living within the 
PRL.13 The authors argue that Poles, both in the PRL and abroad, shared a common goal: the 
discovery and disclosure of facts surrounding the Katyń massacre’s perpetrators. There are many 
strengths to the authors’ chapter examining Katyń in Poland, particularly their examination of the 
representations of mourning of the Katyń victims in Warsaw’s Powązkowski Military Cemetery. 
This site became an important and contentious one in the battle for memorialization and 
                                                          
Routledge. 2015; Urszula Jarecka’s examination of rhetorical strategies used in present-day discourses on Katyń in 
““Wounded Memory: Rhetorical Strategies Used in Public Discourse on the Katyń Massacre,” in The Long 
Aftermath: Cultural Legacies of Europe at War, 1936-2016. New York: Berghahn Books. 2016.; and Maria 
Kobielski’s “Endless aftershock. The Katyń Massacre in Contemporary Polish Culture,” in Traumatic Memories of 
the Second World War and After. Cham: Springer International Publishing. pp. 197-219. In the broader Polish 
language scholarship on collective memory and the Second World War, there are two significant contributions to the 
scholarship examining the collective memory of the Second World War in Polish. Please see Lech Nijakowski’s 
Polskie Polityki pamięci. Esej socjologiczny (Warszawa: WAiP, 2008) and Adam Ostolski’s Trauma i pamięci 
publiczna. Spuścizna II wojny światowej w pamięci zbiorowej współczesnej Polski (unpublished manuscript of 
doctoral dissertation, Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology, Uniwersytet Warszawski, 2011).  
11 Alexander Etkind, Rory Finnin, et al. Remembering Katyn. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2012, 2. 
12 Etkind, Finnin, et al. Remembering Katyn, 13. 
13 Etkind, Finnin, et al. Remembering Katyn, 14. 
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commemoration between the Soviet aligned government and ordinary Polish citizens over the 
Katyń victims during the near five-decade long existence of the PRL.  
Remembering Katyn is an important contribution, but it is not without its shortcomings. 
Although the authors correctly identify some of the most important contributions made to the re-
remembering and representations of Katyń completed by Polish émigrés in “Polonia” and Poles 
living within the PRL, the work does not successfully incorporate other important attributes and 
processes of the collective memory making of Katyń in Poland. While the Soviet government 
and its state aligned governments did propagate the “Katyń lie,” the Katyn lie was an important 
component of the collective memory making processes of Katyń. Furthermore, there remain 
critical pieces of the Katyń story that are not explored in contributions to the historiography, like 
Remembering Katyn: the influence of various German states on the collective memory making 
processes of Katyń. Early representations of Katyń and the reactionary push for historical truth 
surrounding the mass executions was heavily influenced by the propaganda campaign conducted 
by Nazi Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, and the quest for absolution by the 
government of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany, FRG hereafter). 
The memory making processes of Katyń are a significant intersection of German, Polish, and 
Soviet histories. In a final note on Remembering Katyn, the authors examine literary case studies 
in their section examining representations of Katyn to demonstrate that the struggle to “know” 
Katyń has led way to an understanding of Katyń in Polish literature following the release of the 
Katyń documents. 
 As noted, this examination is problematic in its examinations of early representations of 
Katyń. The representations of Katyń made by contemporaries, primarily Polish émigrés and 
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ordinary Poles living within the PRL, were symbols of their understanding of Katyn. By 
examining select publications and representations made by Polish émigrés and Poles living 
within the PRL, we can better understand how contemporaries interpreted and constructed their 
histories of Katyń within their specific cultural and historical context.  This study seeks to 
expand upon contributions like Remembering Katyn in an attempt to provide a better 
understanding of the process and meaning of truth in relation to Katyń as understood by 
historical actors during their time and the collective memory makings of the event through 
literary and memorial representations.  
Explanation of Methodology 
By way of introduction, it is important to note that while the term “collective memory,” 
appeared in the lexicon of the humanities very early in the twentieth century, the term did not 
gain its greater, current significance to the historiography until the mid-twentieth century.14 
French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs expanded upon the notion of collective memory within 
his groundbreaking, systematic study, On Collective Memory.15 Halbwachs identifies memory as 
a socially informed and constructed notion.16 The construction of memory does not depend on 
the individual; rather, the construction of memory depends on the collective, such as society, 
                                                          
14 Note: Selections of this portion of the thesis project appeared in two unpublished graduate seminar 
papers by the author: Unpublished seminar paper, Amanda Nicole Alarcon, “Review: On Collective Memory,” 
History 593, 10 June 2017 and Unpublished seminar paper, Amanda Nicole Alarcon, “The Discourses on National 
Suffering: the Intersections of Death, Identity, and Collective Memory during the Twentieth Century.” History 532. 
04 December 2017.  
15 Alon Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method,” The American 
Historical Review, Volume 102, Issue 5, 1 December 1997, pp. 1392. 
16 Maurice Halbwachs. On Collective Memory. Lewis A. Coser, trans. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 1992. 
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family, and other groups. The importance of collective memory as a category of analysis in 
historical studies cannot be understated. Following the “memory boom” of the 1990s and 2000s, 
the examination of collective memory had provided scholars with a greater understanding of the 
ways in which society and the state represent their collective, national pasts and sought to 
construct a shared identity from this collective memory.  
In addition to paying special attention to collective memory making, this project will also 
analyze emotions surrounding the event and notable representations of Katyń. The history of 
emotions has rapidly become a topic for historians. The history of emotions is understood as the 
historical inquiry of emotions within the broader examination and context of a culture. Though 
scholars and historians have been interested in the history of emotions across various disciplines, 
history of emotions as a genre has not been widely employed within the study of Polish history. 
Throughout the memory making processes and the processes of the events surrounding Katyń, 
emotions played a significant role. Distinguished modern German historian Alon Confino notes 
the great utility to studying the history of emotions within historical studies of modern German 
history. Confino asserts that: 
“Emotions, like memories, are absolutely individual; social groups cannot feel or remember, much as they 
cannot eat or dance. And yet, one’s emotions, like one’s memory and most intimate dreams, originate 
from the symbols, landscape, practices and language that are shared by a given society…..the history of 
emotions may be most usefully practiced within a larger history of sensibilities….such a history of 
sensibilities would explore emotions such as fear, love and pleasure, but also memory, sacrifice, suicide 
or killing, which are not emotions but make little historical sense if isolated from them.”17 
                                                          
17 Alon Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method,” The American 
Historical Review, Volume 102, Issue 5, 1 December 1997, pp. 1392 
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In the third and fourth chapters of this project, I will examine the contributions made to 
the historical understanding of Katyń by Polish émigrés and Poles living within the PRL during 
the period from the Second World War to the release of the Katyń documents by Soviet premiere 
Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990 and Russian president Boris Yeltsin in 1992, as representations of 
Katyń. “Representations” is the umbrella term for literary writings, photographs, documents, 
memorials, art, testimonies, and “other symbolic usages” of a historical event.18 They were 
created either during or following the historical event. In the case of Katyń, representations have 
been exclusively created following the mass executions that took place from March-June 1940, 
with the exception of Soviet state documents and materials and possessions found on the Polish 
victims of the NKVD mass executions. In Jay Winter’s essay “Historical Remembrance in the 
Twenty-First Century,” Winter notes that: “both the act of producing history and the act of 
remembrance are gestures toward finding meaning in the past.”19 Winter encourages historians to 
examine the creative space between history and memory. He later concludes his essay by stating: 
“Writing the history of the contemporary world is an act of historical remembrance.”20 In Katyn 
and the Soviet Massacre of 1940: Truth, Justice and Memory, George Sanford notes that 
historical truth tends to be “narrativized by an author’s subjectivity and the historical context,” 
thus concluding that there are no ‘real’ or ‘true’ stories.21  Throughout the existence of the PRL 
and “Polonia,” Polish émigrés, writers, historians, and members of Polish society made 
                                                          
18 Magilow and Silverman. Holocaust Representations in History: An Introduction, 1.  
19 Jay Winter. "Foreword: Historical Remembrance in the Twenty-First Century." The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 617 (2008): 6. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25098009. 
20 Winter. "Foreword: Historical Remembrance in the Twenty-First Century," 12. 
21 Sanford. Katyń and the Soviet Massacre of 1940: Truth, Justice and Memory., 157. 
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intentional efforts to document their perceptions of the truth and understanding in the history 
surrounding Katyń. Their contributions served as acts of historical remembrance, thus helping 
shape the collective memory of what we know “Katyń” to be today.  
This project will not examine the mass executions of the murdered 22,000 Polish 
soldiers, officers, police officers, and members of the intelligentsia themselves. Although the 
release of the Katyń documents by the Soviet Union in 1990 provided scholars and historians 
state evidence for the crimes and documentation of the logistics of the mass executions, many 
contemporary histories still rely on the earlier contributions, primarily made by Polish émigrés, 
to construct their histories of Katyń. This project will examine selected representations of Katyń 
and the language implemented to describe the mass executions. At “each stage” of the narrative 
and representations of Katyń, the politics of memory have played an influential role in the 
control, contest, and release of information surrounding the mass executions.22  
The following chapter will examine selected representations of Katyń from Reich 
Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels’s Katyn propaganda campaign, the subsequent response 
from the Soviet government over the “discovery” of the mass graves in the Katyń Forest, and 
Goebbels’ propaganda campaign’s effects on the Polish community, both abroad and in Poland. 
As noted, chapter three will examine selected, significant representations of Katyń made by 
Polish émigrés. The fourth chapter of this project will examine representations made by Poles 
living within the PRL. The fifth and concluding chapter will discuss Katyń, its representations, 
and collective meaning from the early 1990s to 2010 in the present-day Republic of Poland.  
                                                          
22 Drozdzewski, “Knowing (or Not) about Katyń: The Silencing and Surfacing of Public Memory,” 49. 
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A final important note about this study: a study of this magnitude cannot and will not 
examine every recorded representation of Katyń from the Second World War to present-day. 
Rather, I will examine selected representations of Katyń that have made a significant impact on 
the continued understandings of the mass executions. Through this methodology, I hope to 
elucidate upon the importance of perception, contingency, emotion, representations, and the 
complexities of memory in the historical makings and understandings of Katyń. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE “DISCOVERY” OF KATYŃ IN 1943 
 
In a diary entry dated April 9, 1943, Reich Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels 
noted the “discovery” of the mass graves of murdered Polish soldiers, civilians, and various 
members of the intelligentsia by German forces in the Katyń Forest near Smolensk in the 
Western portion of the Soviet Union:23  
“Polish mass graves have been found near Smolensk. The Bolsheviks simply shot 
down and then shoveled into mass graves some 10,000 Polish prisoners, among 
them civilian captives, bishops, intellectuals, artists, et cetera. . . .Gruesome 
aberrations of the human soul were thus revealed. I saw to it that the Polish mass 
graves be inspected by neutral journalists from Berlin. I also had Polish 
intellectuals taken there. They are to see for themselves what is in store for them 
should their wish that the Germans be defeated by the Bolsheviks actually be 
fulfilled.”24 
 
To better understand the importance of the discovery of the mass graves in the Katyń 
Forest in subsequent representations by Polish émigrés and Polies living in the PRL, it is 
important to problematize the notion of “discovery” and the ensuing propaganda campaign 
launched by Goebbels. While Goebbels first notes the “discovery” of the graves on April 9, 
1943 in his diary entries, several scholars believe that high ranking German officials learned 
about the mass graves as early as winter 1941 into spring 1942.25 Following the invasion of the 
                                                          
23 Joseph Goebbels. The Goebbels Diaries: 1942-1943. Trans. Louis P. Lochner. New York: Doubleday & 
Company, Inc. 1948, 318.  
24 Goebbels. The Goebbels Diaries: 1942-1943, 318. 
25 See George Sanford and Anna Cienciala, et al.  
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Soviet Union by Germany during Operation Barbarossa in 1941, the territory surrounding the 
Katyń Forest was under the occupation and control of German forces by late July 1941.26 In 
November 1941, Colonel Friedrich Ahrens arrived in Smolensk to command the military 
regimen.  
Following the Colonel’s arrival, villagers recounted rumors to the occupying German 
forces about the Katyń Forest being utilized as an execution site of political opponents by the 
Bolsheviks.27 During the summer of 1942, Polish workers in a German forced labor battalion 
were told rumors from villagers that Soviet officials had murdered “their Polish countrymen” in 
the Katyń forest.28 A villager from the surrounding area, Ivan Kisselev, took the unknown 
Polish workers to the site where he thought the bodies of the Polish soldiers were buried. 
Kisselev found the site and the Polish workers commemorated the site with a wooden cross, 
though they did not report their discoveries to the German occupying forces.29  
During the early winter of 1943, Colonel Ahrens tracked a wolf through the woods and 
came across the wooden cross on top of an excavated mound. Following an investigation and 
brief excavation, the body of a Polish officer was revealed.30 Colonel Ahrens reported the 
discovery to the Army Group Center in late February 1943. The Army Group Center dispatched 
                                                          
26 Kenneth F. Ledford, “Mass Murderers Discover Mass Murder: The Germans and Katyn, 1943,” Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law. Vol. 44: no. 3 (2012): pp.583. 
27 Paul. Katyn: the Untold Story of Stalin’s Polish Massacre, 203. 
28 Paul. Katyn: the Untold Story of Stalin’s Polish Massacre, 203. 
29 Ibid, 204; Ledford, “Mass Murderers Discover Mass Murder: The Germans and Katyn, 1943,” pp.583. 
30 Paul. Katyn: the Untold Story of Stalin’s Polish Massacre, 204. 
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Professor Dr. Gerhard Buhtz, a forensic pathologist affiliated with the University of Breslau and 
the medical staff of the Army Group, to investigate. The exhumation and autopsy of the remains 
did not take place until March 29th, due to the hard freeze on the ground.31 During the initial 
excavations, nearly eleven mass graves were exhumed.32 These mass graves contained nearly 
3,000 murdered Polish soldiers, officers, and various members of the intelligentsia. In historian 
Kenneth F. Ledford’s essay examining the use of Katyń in Reich propaganda, Ledford notes 
that Joseph Goebbels had likely first gained knowledge of the mass graves of Polish prisoners 
near Smolensk on April 1st or 2nd, 1943.33 
The “discovery” of the mass graves came at an opportune time for propaganda purposes 
as perceived by Goebbels, in relation to the war effort for the Nazi regime. Following the 
military defeat of Stalingrad by German forces in early 1943, Goebbels saw the mass graves as a 
prime opportunity to create tensions between Western Allies, like Great Britain and the United 
States, and the Soviet Union. With the exploitation of the discovery of the mass graves near 
Smolensk, Goebbels sought to address three audiences through the Katyń propaganda campaign: 
1). the Poles living in the General-Government in hopes of mobilizing Poles against the 
impending Soviet army invasion, 2). the Western Allies in an effort to sow “dissension” between 
them and the Soviet government, and 3). the German people, to steel them for an “increased 
defensive effort by instilling in them fear of the consequences of a Soviet victory.”34 The 
                                                          
31 Ledford, “Mass Murderers Discover Mass Murder: The Germans and Katyn, 1943,” pp.583 
32 Paul. Katyn: the Untold Story of Stalin’s Polish Massacre, 205. 
33 Ledford, “Mass Murderers Discover Mass Murder: The Germans and Katyn, 1943,” pp.584. 
34 Ibid, pp.586.  
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discovery of the mass graves and the subsequent exhumations presented a problem for Goebbels, 
as a percentage of the executed officers were found to be Polish Jews. In addition to this issue, 
German forces committed atrocities against Polish members of the intelligentsia and leaders as 
the Soviets had done during the invasion of Poland in September 1939.35 
Before announcing the discovery of the mass graves to a global audience, Goebbels 
arranged for a delegation of Polish leaders to fly from Warsaw, Kraków, and Lublin to Smolensk 
on April 10th. 36 On April 11th, the public propaganda campaign began through an address on the 
German news agency Trans-Ocean, though the effort would not gain global traction until April 
13th. On April 13th, 1943, Radio Berlin broadcasted an announcement that reports had reached 
Berlin from Smolensk, where German forces discovered the mass graves of thousands of Polish 
officers murdered by Soviet forces: 
“It is reported from Smolensk that the local inhabitants have indicated to the 
German authorities a place in which mass executions had been carried out by the 
Bolsheviks and where 10,000 Polish officers had been murdered by the 
GPU….the total number of Polish officers corpses amounts to 10,000, which 
would correspond more or less to the entire Polish officer corps captured and 
taken prisoner by the Bolsheviks.”37,38 
 
                                                          
35 Ledford, “Mass Murderers Discover Mass Murder: The Germans and Katyn, 1943,” pp.579. 
36 Ledford, “Mass Murderers Discover Mass Murder: The Germans and Katyn, 1943,” pp.584. 
37 “Pierwszy Komunikat Radia Niemieckiego,” (First German Radio Communique) in Anders. Zbrodnia 
Katyńska w Świetle Dokumentów, 85. The selected quote from the document has been translated from Polish to 
English by the author of this study, Amanda Nicole Alarcon.  
38 Note: The GPU is an older name used for the NKVD. 
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Within the Radio Berlin announcement, German officials correctly posited that the 
murdered Polish officers were transported from the Kozelsk camp to the Katyń Forest near 
Smolensk. In following representations by the German Nazi government, the numbers increased 
to 11,000 to 12,000 murdered Polish officers.39 The fluctuating numbers utilized during the 
commencement of the propaganda campaign are vitally important in understanding subsequent 
representations of the mass executions made by the Polish government-in-exile, Polish émigrés, 
and Polish citizens living within Poland.  
Following the Radio Berlin announcement, the Soviet government responded to the 
accusations put forth by German officials in a communique titled “Vile Acquisitions by the 
German-Fascist Murders” from Moscow on April 15th, 1943. Within the communique, Radio 
Moscow broadcasted a counter-attack to the Radio Berlin broadcast: 
“In the past two or three days Goebbels’ slanderers have been spreading vile 
fabrications alleging that the Soviet authorities carried out a mass shooting of 
Polish officers in the Spring of 1940, in the Smolensk area. In launching this 
monstrous investigation the German-Fascist scoundrels did not hesitate to spread 
the most unscrupulous and base lies, in their attempts to cover up the crimes  
which, as has now become evident, were perpetrated themselves. The German-
Fascist report on this subject leave no doubt as to the tragic fate of the former 
Polish prisoners-of-war in 1941 were engaged in construction work in areas west 
of the Smolensk region and who fell into the hands of German-Fascist hangmen 
in the summer of 1941, after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the 
Smolensk area……”40 
 
                                                          
39 Sanford. Katyń and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, 128. 
40 “Communique Issued by the Sovinformburo Attacking the German ‘Fabrications’ about the Graves of 
Polish Officers in Katyn Forest, 15 April 1943, Moscow,” Document 102, Translated by Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia 
S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech Materski in Katyn: A Crime without Punishment, 306. 
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The initial reaction to the Radio Berlin announcement was one of diffidence by Poles 
residing in London.41 The announcement had a more immense, immediate effect upon the Polish 
government-in-exile residing in London, as it launched them into a precarious situation between 
the Western allies and the Soviet government. As noted in the previous chapter, both German 
and Polish forces had rounded up members of the Polish intelligentsia and military and 
perpetrated violent atrocities against Polish people during the September campaign in 1939. The 
Polish government set out on April 15th in search of “what they regarded as the definite facts,” in 
reports confirmed by sources in the USSR about the missing Polish POWs.42 The results of the 
report presented more difficulties for the Polish government-in-exile in regards to their relations 
with the Soviet government. While the government could not confirm that 10,000 Polish officers 
had been murdered by the Soviets in the Katyń Forest as reported by Radio Berlin at the time, 
the report showed that over 15,000 Polish officers had been held in Kozelsk (approximately 
5,000), Starobelsk (3920), and Ostashkov (6,570) as prisoners of war by the Soviets.43 The ones 
from Kozelsk were transported towards Smolensk by Soviet forces in 1940. While there was no 
debate that the Polish officers were executed, there was a contest between the German and Soviet 
governments on who perpetrated the mass executions. The answer lay in finding out the date of 
the mass executions, which would require forensic investigation and analysis. 
                                                          
41 “Pierwszy Komunikat Radia Sowieckiego,” (First Soviet Radio Communique) in Anders. Zbrodnia 
Katyńska w Świetle Dokumentów, 86. 
42 Sanford. Katyń and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, 128. 
43 Ibid, 128.  
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After an analysis of this report, the Polish government-in-exile could not accept at face 
value the Soviet assertion that the Germans had committed the atrocities in the Katyń Forest.44 
Calls for an independent, impartial investigation were soon issued by the Polish government. On 
April 16th, the Polish War Minister Lieutenant Gen. Marian Kukiel requested an impartial 
investigation by a Red Cross commission “on the spot” to understand who murdered the 15,000 
missing POWs and why they appeared to “simply” disappear.45  Simultaneously, the German 
government requested an impartial investigation of the mass graves found in the Katyń Forest 
near Smolensk. The Polish request for an independent investigation led to the Soviet Minister of 
Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov arguing that the Poles had used “the slanderous Hitlerite fake” as an 
attempt to regain the contested Borderlands of Belarus, Ukraine, and Lithuania.46 Eventually, the 
issue would lead to the severing of diplomatic ties by Josef Stalin between the Soviet 
government and the Polish government-in-exile on April 25, 1943. 
Following the Radio Berlin broadcast, Goebbels continued a press campaign to vilify the 
Soviets and deepen a rhetorical motif of equating Bolshevism and Jews through representations 
of the mass executions of the Polish officers. Through works published during the press 
campaign, “Katyń” first entered the lexicon of the crime to symbolize the mass graves found in 
the Katyń Forest to Poles living within German occupied Poland. In Kraków, lists of the 
murdered Polish officers were published in the Polish language, Nazi propaganda newspaper 
                                                          
44 Ibid. 
45 Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES. "POLES ASK INQUIRY IN SOVIET 'MURDERS'." New York 
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Goniec Krakowski (The Kraków Messenger). On April 15th, 1943, the newspaper first published 
the “discovery” of the mass graves found near the Katyń Forest in Smolensk.47 On April 17, 
1943, photographs of the mass graves in the Katyń Forest were published in the newspaper with 
the headline, “Wrażenia krakowskiego robotnika w lesie pod Katyniem (Impression of a Kraków 
worker in the forest near Katyń).” 48 In the April 20, 1943 issue of Goniec Krakowski, a “new list 
of the names of the identified Polish officers’ bodies,” appeared in the paper.49  In subsequent 
issues of the newspaper, names of the executed Polish officers would continue to be published 
with identifiable information about the deceased officers such as rank or documents found on the 
bodies.50 In addition to the list of names published by the German backed Goniec Krakowski, the 
underground Polish resistance movement, Armia Krajowa (Home Army, AK hereafter), 
published the growing list of those identified in the Katyń Forest in underground publications 
during this time. The names of the identified bodies were also announced in the streets of 
Kraków during the campaign. The news would cause “nationwide indignation and sorrow,” as it 
was received across occupied Poland.51 The list of names came to be collectively known as “lista 
                                                          
47 Włodzimierz Długoszwekski, Goniec Krakowski. 1943, nr 88. 409317 IV. Archive: Biblioteka 
Jagiellońska. Kraków, Polska. 15 April 1943. Accessed via: 
https://jbc.bj.uj.edu.pl/dlibra/publication/142364/edition/134252/content?ref=desc 
48 Włodzimierz Długoszwekski, Goniec Krakowski. 1943, nr 90. 409317 IV. Archive: Biblioteka 
Jagiellońska. Kraków, Polska. 17 April 1943. Accessed via: 
https://jbc.bj.uj.edu.pl/dlibra/publication/142367/edition/134254/content?ref=desc 
49 Włodzimierz Długoszwekski “Nowa lista nazwisk zidentyfikowanych zwłok oficerów polskich,” (New 
list of the names of the identified Polish officers’ bodies) in Goniec Krakowski. 1943, nr 92. 409317 IV. Archive: 
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50 For reference, please see digital copies of Goniec Krakowski on the digital archive website of Biblioteka 
Jagiellońska, with particular emphasis on issues from April 20, 1943 onward.  
51 Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940: Truth, Justice, and Memory, 133. 
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katyńska (the Katyń List),” as a result of the lists’ publications in newspapers like Goniec 
Krakowski throughout Poland.  
Within Germany, the propaganda campaign took the form of print and documentaries to 
further capitalize upon growing fears of Bolshevism. In the Nazi newspaper Völkischer 
Beobachter (Völkischer Observer) articles were published equating the perceived violence and 
threat of Bolshevism with Jews, such as “The Mass Murder of Katyn: The Work of Jewish 
Butchers,” and “Judah’s Blood Guilt Grows to Unfathomable.”52 Nazi officials extensively 
documented the exhumation and autopsy of the murdered Polish officers in the Katyń Forest 
through photographs, newsreels, and video footage throughout the month of April until their 
investigation was “interrupted by the heat” in June 1943. Scholar George Sanford posits that the 
approaching Soviet army likely interrupted the conclusion of the investigation.53 This 
documentary footage was incorporated into the widely received film, Im Wald von Katyn (In the 
Forest of Katyń).54 Within the film, the narrator guides the audience through a narrative 
reconstruction of the mass executions and the exhumation and autopsy processes. Throughout 
the film, the narrator condemns the Bolsheviks for the murders, switching between footage of 
selected recovered personal belongings of the murdered officers and the footage of the 
decomposed bodies of the Polish officers.55 In fall 1943, the German Foreign Office published a 
massive collection of documents, photographs, and the list of the murdered officers’ names 
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under the titles, Amtliches Material zum Massenmord von Katyn (Official Material on the Mass 
Murder of Katyń) and Der Massenmord im Walde von Katyn: Ein Tatsachenbericht auf Grund 
Amtlicher Unterlagen (The Mass Murder in the Forest of Katyń: A Factual Account on the Basis 
of Official Documents).56 The Katyń propaganda campaign soon came to an end in September 
1943. Goebbels noted in a diary entry dated September 29, 1943: 
“Unfortunately we have had to give up Katyn. The Bolsheviks undoubtedly will 
soon “find” that we shot the 12,000 Polish officers. That episode is one that is 
going to cause us quite a little trouble in the future. The Soviets are undoubtedly 
going to make it their business to discover as many mass graves as possible and 
then blame them on us.”57 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Nazi propaganda campaign, it appeared evident that the 
campaign failed to achieve all of the objectives put forth by Goebbels. Though the campaign 
placed the Polish government-in-exile in a precarious situation with the Soviet government and 
diplomatic ties were severed between the two countries’ governments, the Western Allies (Great 
Britain and the United States) remained relatively silent about the question of Katyń during the 
Second World War and throughout the Cold War period. In 1943, the American and British 
governments came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union was guilty of the mass executions of 
the Polish officers in the Katyń Forest, however the governments suppressed the “actual truth” of 
the executions in an effort to maintain their alliance with the Soviet Union for the war effort.58 
Though the German Nazi propaganda campaign also failed to mobilize Poles into a joint defense 
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with Nazi Germany in the General Government, the campaign had a lasting legacy on the ways 
in which Polish émigrés wrote and conceptualized the mass executions of Polish officers and 
soldiers in the Katyń Forest.  
In late 1943, the Soviet Union established a Special Commission under the direction of 
Nikolai Burdenko, to establish their “truth” about the Katyń crime.59 The Commission would 
come to be known as the Burdenko Commission. As soon as the Soviet army took control of the 
Smolensk area, the Special Commission and investigation team were ready to begin their 
forensic analysis campaign of the mass graves located in the Katyń Forest. The “investigation” 
lasted less than a month, supported by the Soviet state’s forensic-pathological forces, police, and 
other resources needed to conduct the investigation. The brief of the Special Commission tasked 
the force to “confirm” the “Circumstances of the Shooting of Polish Officer Prisoners by the 
German-Fascist Invaders in the Katyn Forest.”60 The Soviet medical-forensic team “confirmed” 
that German forces were the ones that killed the Polish officers “between July and September 
1941,” following the German occupation of the Smolensk area in July 1941.61 Throughout the 
report, there were several witnesses that were also interviewed in the German report on Katyń 
that “changed” their testimony surrounding the mass executions of the Polish officers. The 
witnesses quoted in the Soviet report that their testimony surrounding the Soviet perpetration of 
the executions in the German report on Katyń was coerced by Gestapo beatings and threats.62 
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George Sanford posits that this change in testimony is not surprising, as the witnesses were 
villagers living in the surrounding Smolensk area, which was now under the control of the Soviet 
government.63 The report was endorsed by Burdenko in early January 1944. The report became 
the basis for the Soviet state representation of the perpetrators behind the mass executions of the 
Polish officers and by extension, the state sponsored history that was told to the outside world 
until 1990.64 This representation would be challenged extensively from the end of the Second 
World War in Europe to the collapse of communism by Polish émigrés living within the United 
States and Britain and ordinary Poles living within the PRL. The next chapter will explore 
selected representations from Polish émigrés in light of the International Military Tribunal trials 
in Nuremberg in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
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CHAPTER THREE: REPRESENTATIONS OF KATYŃ BY POLISH 
ÉMIGRÉS  
 
Introduction: A Note about “Polonia:” Polish Émigrés and the “Polish 
Diaspora” 
Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, nearly twelve million Poles emigrated to 
countries across the world. Within these countries, Polish émigrés often created diasporic 
communities with nationalistic, constructed elements. These diasporic communities would often 
refer to themselves as “Polonia,” a contested and constructed symbol of Polish émigrés’ 
collective identity that was intimately tied to their homeland, Poland.65 The Encyclopedia of 
Diaspora defines the term “diaspora” to refer to the resettled communities of those forcibly 
dispersed from their homelands, such as Jews and Armenians, who held a strong identification 
“with their homelands and distinct groups identities through community boundaries shaped by 
hostile responses in places of settlement.”66 As these diasporic groups created their distinctive 
community identities in their respective places of settlement, negotiations of character and 
identity of the community occurred.  
The “Polish diaspora,” posited by scholar Jolanta A. Drzewiecka, holds its historic roots 
in the “struggle” for an independent Polish state throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and the post Second World War period. 67 The contributing factors to the Polish 
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diaspora are varied. Following the partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end 
of the eighteenth century, the first diasporic communities began to appear across the world. 
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, revolutions, economic disparities, and war 
produced Polish diasporic communities throughout Europe, Latin America, and the United 
States.  
As noted, diasporic communities often embark on careful self-negotiations of what 
constitutes the character and identity of their respective diasporic community. Throughout the 
existences of the various, Polish diasporic communities across the world, these negotiations have 
taken place and the character of the community has transformed over time. These negotiations 
have often encompassed ethnic and religious considerations. Throughout the modern period, 
many different peoples and ethnic groups have existed in Polish lands, such as non-Jewish Poles, 
Jewish Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Germans, and many 
others.68  Within the Polish diaspora, Polish Jews were presented as “an issue” to diasporic 
consciousness during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.69 Although Polish Jews have lived 
for centuries in Polish lands and interacted with non-Jewish Poles consistently, most Poles 
considered Jewish Poles to be a “separate ethnic group,” thus not belonging to the Polish 
diasporic communities.70 Within the United States and other Polish diasporic communities, 
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instances of antisemitism would occur against Jewish Poles throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.71 Catholic Poles primarily constituted the Polish diasporic communities. 
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the largest Polish emigration 
occurred to the United States.72 While the vast majority of Polish émigrés migrated to the United 
States for economic reasons prior to the Second World War, a diasporic consciousness was 
evident among the Polish-American community.73 Polish immigrants considered themselves as 
the “American Polonia.” Polish immigrants considered “American Polonia” as a fourth partition 
of Poland during the nineteenth century.74 Within the United States, Polish émigré communities 
held deep sentiment of victimization and exile due to “foreign oppression” and political 
suppression following the partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century.75 
The Second World War marked a decisive turning point for Poles both living inside and 
outside of the country. The term “Polonia” came to especially symbolize the Polish émigrés 
living outside of Poland during the outbreak of the Second World War, the war years, and the 
post-war period. Nearly 3,000 Polish civilians fled to London alone at the outbreak of the Second 
World War. Following the defeat of France in 1940, Poles living throughout the United Kingdom 
organized themselves into military units and communities. In London, the Polish government 
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reconstituted itself in exile under General Władysław Sikorski. The Polish government-in-exile 
primarily employed Polish civilians living in London.76 The government-in-exile maintained 
residence in London throughout the war and the post-war period.  
The Second World War left a decisive impact on the character of the Polish diaspora. In 
1945, nearly six million Poles remained outside of Polish national borders.77 Following the Yalta 
Conference in February 1945 in which Poland was perceived to have been relegated to the 
“Soviet sphere of influence,” hundreds of thousands of Poles were faced with the choice to return 
to Poland or stay abroad.78 While many Poles returned to Poland, there were substantial numbers 
of Poles that stayed in refugee camps, displaced persons camps, or in-exile communities that 
were established during the war, like the community in London. Many Poles settled in the United 
States, Britain, and throughout the former British Commonwealth in countries like Canada and 
Australia.79 Poles also settled in countries throughout Europe and Latin America. 
Depending upon the respective countries of Polish diasporic communities’ settlement, the 
character of the Polish diasporic communities decidedly took on an anti-communist viewpoint in 
many countries across the world. Within these post-war, anti-communist diasporic communities, 
Polish Jews were largely absent from Polonia organizations and the community. Within the 
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United States, many Polonia organizations largely identified themselves as Catholic 
organizations and they were often anti-Jewish in practice.80 It is important to note that this 
exclusion did not occur due to the population size of Polish Jews living within the United States, 
as many Polish Jews had immigrated to the United States following the Holocaust and anti-
Semitic purges of Jews by the Polish Communist government in the 1950s and 1960s.81 Outside 
of the “Polonia” communities of the United States, these anti-Jewish sentiments occurred in 
communities in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Austria, Denmark, and many other countries.82 
Although members of the diasporic communities no longer remained in Polish national 
borders, issues pertinent to Poland, like Katyń, remained an integral part of the Polish émigré 
community. Cited as one of the few issues in which the wider Polish émigré community could 
unite over, significant contributions were made to establishing the “truth” and history 
surrounding Katyń by Polish émigrés following the end of the Second World War. These 
contributions were made by émigrés living in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, 
and many other countries throughout the world. Throughout this chapter, I will be examining 
select contributions made to the understanding of Katyń by Polish émigré in the United States 
and Great Britain. As noted, the greatest emigration of Poles occurred to the United States. 
Following the end of the Second World War, the “American Polonia” persisted as the leading, 
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diasporic community.83 Throughout the Second World War and the post-war period, the 
“epicenter” of émigré political activity was London.84 Although the British government ceased to 
recognize the Polish government-in-exile as a legitimate, political entity following the Yalta 
Conference, the Polish government-in-exile existed in London until 1990. Each year, the Polish 
émigré community in London organized memorial events for the Katyń dead.85 In the United 
States, members of the United States House of Representatives established a commission to 
investigate the “truth” about Katyń in the early 1950s. While the commission was established 
during the onset of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, this 
commission was also made possible by efforts and protests made within the Polish American 
community over the issue of Katyń.86 Polish émigrés’ contributions to the continued 
understanding of Katyń made an inconsequential impact to the memory of the crime in Poland, 
particularly during the creation and existence of the Soviet aligned government in the PRL: 
“Because the people in Poland were forbidden from knowing about these subjects, 
the memory of them survived to a great degree because of efforts of the émigré 
community….These voices were raised in the West for forty-five years, but after a 
while the issue became a great bore. People were horrified when the Russian tanks 
crushed the Hungarians in 1956 and rolled into Czechoslovakia in 1968. There 
were many demonstrations and it was all heroic, but it soon failed. The West sort 
of, in a sense, wrote Eastern Europe off. In that situation, you have to learn to 
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tailor protest to the environment you are living in, to keep the embers aglow 
without becoming a nuisance. We did that pretty well.”87 
Throughout the existence of the PRL, representations, commemorations, and activism 
surrounding Katyń was made possible by earlier contributions made by Polish émigré within 
Great Britain and the United States.  
The International Military Tribunal and the Polish Émigré Community 
Following the end of the Second World War in Europe, the Allies settled on establishing 
the International Military Tribunal to try German war criminals in Nuremberg. The series of 
prosecutions would come to be collectively known as the Nuremberg Trials. The Tribunal was 
established to conduct trials and punishments of “the major war criminals of the Axis countries” 
and to “have the power to try and punish persons, who acting in the interests of the European 
Axis countries, whether as individuals or members of organizations” that committed crimes 
against peace.88  The Tribunal was also tasked with prosecuting individuals for a new category of 
crime, “crimes against humanity.”89 This category included assassination, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, ill treatment of prisoners of war, and any other inhuman action 
committed against civilians before or after the after the war, as well as persecution on political, 
racial, or religious grounds.  
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At the outset of the trial, the Tribunal accepted a proposal from the Allied powers, 
requesting that the alleged crimes committed by the Allied Powers not be prosecutable during the 
series of trials. The acceptance of the proposal protected attacks on the Soviets over the issue of 
Katyń from the commencement of the trials. The charges against German Nazi leaders included 
the mass execution of the Polish officers found at Katyń. This charge was added against the 
advice of British Attorney General Sir Hartley Shawcross.90 On July 1, 1946, the Tribunal heard 
its first “evidence” against the German Nazi officials for the mass executions of the Polish 
officers found in the Katyń Forest.91 The indictment read: “In September 1941, 11,000 Polish 
officers, prisoners of war, were killed in the Katyn woods near Smolensk.”92 The only supporting 
document that was submitted for consideration for the Tribunal was the Burdenko Commission 
Report, in which the Soviet state found German forces responsible for the crime.93  
During the trials, former Nazi officials sought to clear themselves of the Katyń crime. 
Following extensive witness interviews, the Katyń case was not listed in the International 
Military Tribunal’s final verdicts. In private, the Tribunal decided that the war crimes of Katyń 
were not perpetrated by the Germans. Thus, their responsibility for prosecuting Katyń ended, as 
the former Nazi government officials were on trial, not the Soviets.94 Following the end of the 
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International Military Tribunal, the crime of Katyń was officially recognized as a Nazi crime by 
the Soviet government, though in the late 1940s, the event was not to “be recognized at all.”95 As 
part of the agreement reached by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union at 
the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Poland became incorporated into the Soviet Union in the 
reconstruction of Europe following the Second World War. The state would become the Polska 
Rzeczpospolita Ludowa (the People’s Republic of Poland, PRL hereafter), politically aligned 
with the Soviet government. Thus, representations of Katyń made in the PRL by ordinary Poles 
were a particularly dangerous and even fatal endeavor. The consequences ranged from legal 
punishment and imprisonment to even death.96 This did not stop ordinary Poles from 
representing the event, however. This chapter will examine significant Polish émigrés’ 
contributions to the understanding and memory making processes of Katyń throughout the 
various Polish diasporic communities, some of which were eventually smuggled into the PRL. 
By doing so, we can better understand how Polish émigrés’ contributions served as a dual project 
of history and memory: “writing the history of the contemporary world is an act of historical 
remembrance.”97 
Selected Representations of Katyń from Polish Émigrés during the Early Cold 
War Period 
 
Zbrodnia Katyńska a Świetle Dokumentów, 1948 
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Throughout the International Military Tribunal, Poles living in London made several 
attempts to present their information to the Tribunal but were denied the opportunity.98  While 
the London Poles were denied the opportunity to present their information and evidence to the 
International Military Tribunal, this denial did not prevent future attempts made by Polish 
émigrés living in the United States and Great Britain from theorizing who the executioners of the 
Katyń victims were and when they were murdered.  Following the conclusion of the International 
Military Tribunal trials in Nuremberg, significant efforts to posit who the perpetrators were and 
when the Polish officers had been executed would be made by Polish émigrés living within the 
United States and Great Britain. Polish émigrés—particularly those forcibly exiled from 
Poland—had already begun conducting research and compiling documentation to understand the 
circumstances in which the Polish officers were murdered to posit who murdered the thousands 
of officers, soldiers, and other Polish members of the intelligentsia in the Katyń Forest and when 
they were executed during the Second World War.  
In 1948, one of the most significant émigré contributions to the evolving understanding 
of Katyń was published in the Polish language work Zbrodnia Katyńska w Świetle Dokumentów 
(The Katyń Crime in Light of the Documents). The work holds a further special significance to 
this study, as the work first introduced the commonly used present-day Polish phrase “zbrodnia 
katyńska (the crime of Katyń)” to the Polish lexicon of words and phrases used to signify and 
describe the mass executions of the thousands of Polish officers in the Katyń Forest. It is 
important to note that the work did not invent the term. The term “Katyń crime” was first 
introduced by the Soviet government in official responses to deny their culpability in the mass 
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executions. Zbrodnia Katyńska w Świetle Dokumentów was published in London, the “epicenter” 
of émigré activity. 
At the time of publication, Zbrodnia Katyńska w Świetle Dokumentów was published 
without any identifiable author information, with the exception of General Władysław Anders’ 
foreword and his work on the volume being credited at the time of publication in 1948.  Several 
people worked on the compilation and analysis of documents in Zbrodnia Katyńska under the 
work of one editor.99 In present-day understandings and interpretations of Zbrodnia Katyńska, 
we now know the identities of some of the contributors to the work, most importantly the 
identity of the editor of the volume: Jósef Mackiewicz. Mackiewicz’ report on the Katyń mass 
graves in 1943 caused his involuntary flight from Poland to the West and his name was 
“cleansed” from the public sphere as a result.100 One of the few survivors of the NKVD 
executions, Stanisław Świaniewicz, also anonymously contributed to the volume. 
 There is no one figure more well-known in this research perhaps than Polish Military 
General Władysław Anders. Born in former Russian Poland, Władysław Anders had a 
longstanding military career dating back to the First World War. Anders served in the Russian 
Army from 1914 to 1917, the Polish Army from 1918-1925—notably during the Polish-Soviet 
War—and was the commander of the Cavalry Operational Group in the Polish army during the 
September 1939 campaign. Anders was captured by the Soviet Army in Lwów (Lviv). Anders 
was deported to the Soviet Union, where he was imprisoned in the Lubyanka Prison in Moscow 
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until August 1941.101 On August 4th, 1941, the Soviets released Anders as part of the newly 
formed alliance between the Soviet and Polish governments following the German invasion of 
the Soviet Union in June 1941.102 The Polish government-in-exile appointed Anders as the 
commander in chief of the military forces in the USSR and the Soviet forces had already 
approved the appointment. Anders was tasked with forming military units out of the population 
of formerly imprisoned, Polish officers and other military members captured by the Soviets. 
Long before the appointment, Anders had learned about the internment camps of 
Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov from his cellmate during his imprisonment at Lubyanka.103 
In the prison, rumors about thousands of missing Polish officers, soldiers, and others last seen at 
these internment camps circulated throughout the prison. Following Anders’ release, the issue of 
the missing men became a constant force that informed each of his “endeavors and efforts” 
throughout his appointment as commander of the Polish forces in the USSR.104 In a December 
3rd meeting between Josef Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, Polish military leader Władysław 
Sikorski, and Anders, the issue of the missing Polish soldiers arose as an immediate topic of 
inquiry and concern for the Polish representatives at the meeting. At the beginning of the 
encounter, Sikorski declared that important terms of the alliance were not being fulfilled, 
particularly the release of the thousands of men held at Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov. 
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Arguing that the prisoners were still unaccounted for, Stalin told Sikorski and Anders that the 
prisoners simply escaped. Anders immediately asked Stalin:  
“Where could they have escaped to?”  
“Well, to Manchuria,” Stalin replied.105  
 
 Following the reply, Sikorski and Anders argued that it would be impossible for the 
thousands of men from the three camps to make it thousands of miles undetected across the vast 
expanse of the Soviet Union. Eventually, Stalin told them that the prisoners were freed, but had 
not yet arrived to the assembly location for Anders’ army at Buzuluk. Unknown to Sikorski and 
Anders at the time of the exchange, the men would never arrive. In subsequent recollections on 
the period, Anders would recount the frustration that accompanied his attempts to locate the men 
and to find out what had happened to the thousands of men formerly interned in the Kozelsk, 
Starobelsk, and Ostashkov camps. More than 8,000 commissioned and thousands of non-
commissioned officers were still unaccounted for by Anders throughout his time in the Soviet 
Union.106 When Radio Berlin announced the “discovery” of the mass graves to the world and 
accompanied a list of the names of the Katyń victims that matched the missing officers from the 
camps, Anders could “not have doubts” about what happened to the missing men.107  
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 In the foreword of Zbrodnia Katyńska, Anders identifies several factors as the motivation 
for the study. Of the utmost significance to the work, Anders classifies the compilation and 
publication of the study as a reaction to the omission of Katyń in the Nuremberg Trial 
verdicts.108 The work seeks to act as an intervention into government representations of the 
crime, by giving a “true” account of the affair, which had been shrouded in misinformation and 
silence.109 Throughout the work, the Zbrodnia Katyńska contributors provide a historical 
background to the capture of the Polish officers, the deportations and mass executions of these 
officers, a reconstruction of the events leading up to the discovery of the mass graves in Katyń, 
Zbrodnia Katyńska is divided into four sections: before the “disclosure” of the mass graves, the 
disclosure of the crime and published documents, additional Polish documentation, and 
concluding analysis of who perpetrated the mass executions of the Polish officers found in the 
Katyń Forest.110 The work utilizes documents from the German and Soviet governments, 
photographs of the mass graves, diaries and other personal documents from the murdered Polish 
prisoners, Soviet newspapers from 1940 found on the bodies of the prisoners, and other 
documentary evidence on the mass executions. The work concludes with the argument that the 
Soviet NKVD was responsible for the crimes committed in the Katyń Forest. 
 Following the publication of Zbrodnia Katyńska in London, the work was “widely and 
repeatedly” circulated in the Polish underground.111 The work became known as the seminal 
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bridge between the Polish émigrés outside of the PRL and activists living within the PRL. In the 
following chapter of this project, the Powązkowski Cemetery and representations of the Katyń in 
the PRL will be explored. In addition to the impact that the publication had on representations of 
Katyń in the PRL, the publication had lasting effects on subsequent publications and studies on 
Katyń by Polish émigrés across the world, notably in the United States and Great Britain. The 
work would be published in an English language edition of the work in 1965 on the twentieth 
anniversary of the Nuremberg Trials.112 In 1989, a fifth edition of the work would be published, 
just one year before the release of the Katyń documents by Soviet premiere Mikhail Gorbachev. 
The Cold War, American Media, and Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest 
Massacre, 1962 
Until the publication of Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Massacre by J.K. 
Zawodny in 1962, Anna Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech Materski argue that the 
American media was relatively silent about Katyń.113 Upon further investigation, this claim does 
not withstand scrutiny. Between the “discovery” of the mass graves in 1943 and the publication 
of Death in the Forest in 1962, hundreds of articles and letters to the editor were published in the 
New York Times on the issue of Katyń alone within the United States. In 1952, over 80 articles 
and letters to the editor were published in the wake of the House of Representatives’ 
investigation on the issue of Katyń in the New York Times. 
                                                          
112 Władysław Anders. The Crime of Katyn: Facts & Documents. London: Polish Cultural Foundation. 
1965. 
113 Cienciala, Lebedeva, and Materski in Katyn: A Crime without Punishment, 242. 
 
 
41 
 
 
 Following the “Sovietization” of Eastern Europe and the onset of hostile relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, a renewed and distinctly 
politicized interest in the “truth” about the ‘Katyn Forest Massacre’ was undertaken by members 
of the United States government. On September 18th, 1951, the House of Representatives voted 
unanimously to “conduct an investigation of the facts, evidence, and circumstances of the Katyn 
Forest Massacre.”114 Through this announcement and subsequent explanations, the introduction 
of the terms “the Katyn Forest massacre” and “Katyn massacre” appeared in the English 
language lexicon to describe the mass executions in the Katyń Forest.  
The Select Committee tasked with conducting the investigation were members of the 
United States House of Representative that hailed from districts with high numbers of Polish 
émigrés and Polish-Americans in their constituencies. The Committee held hearings during the 
height of the Korean War, interviewing American and Polish émigrés, members of the 
Nuremberg prosecution team, three German officers questioned at Nuremberg such as Colonel 
Friedrich Ahrens (the German Colonel who discovered the mass graves in the Katyń Forest), and 
Polish figures such as General Władysław Anders.115  
In American media outlets like the New York Times, the hearings were extensively 
covered throughout the early months of 1952. The coverage of the hearings produced many 
visceral reactions among members of American “Polonia,” as well as the Polish Embassy within 
the United States. One such editorial “Repercussions of Katyn,” detailed the contention between 
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the Polish Embassy and the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, as well as the repercussions of the 
congressional hearings. 116 In early March 1952, the Polish Embassy published a press release 
that accused the United States of using “poisoned weapons inherited from Goebbels” in its 
investigation of Katyń, such as the German documents on the crime.117 In response, Secretary of 
State Acheson barred the Polish Embassy from producing further publications on the Katyń 
investigation. The editorial’s anonymous author highlights perceptions of Katyń in the political 
memory landscape of the war in the United States at the time, as the author notes that Katyń was 
the “most grisly incident” of the Second World War.118 
Following the editorial’s publication, a series of editorial letters were received in 
response to the contents and claims of the March 23rd editorial. In one such editorial titled, “To 
Make Katyn Possible,” Nathaniel Kleitman argued that through the “heat of the argument over 
which side did the brutal killings—and both regimes were equally mendacious and equally 
capable of committing mass murder—one overlooks the original crime perpetrated by the Soviet 
Government….slave labor.”119 Within the editorial letter, Kleitman notes that Katyn was only 
made possible due to the detainment and forced labor of the Polish prisoners of war by the Soviet 
Union. In response to Kleitman’s editorial, former United States Ambassador to Poland, Arthur 
Bliss Lane, refuted many of the points made by Kleitman as “errors of fact,” with particular 
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emphasis on Kleitman’s argument on forced labor.120 Lane notes that the Polish officers that 
were executed were not “detained as slave laborers in the guise of prisoners of war,” but rather 
“prisoners even though no declaration of war against Poland had been by the Soviet Union” until 
the deportation of the Polish officers by the Soviet Union between the months of “March to May 
1940.”121 Lane admonishes the New York Times for publishing such a letter as Kleitman’s 
editorial and states “..it is obviously highly important that the American public should not accept 
the distorted and completely false information given out by Pravda [the Soviet state media outlet] 
after the graves of those murdered men were found in 1943.”122 Lane’s editorial was met with 
response from Kleitman, who stated that the dates utilized by Kleitman in his letter to disprove 
Kleitman’s forced labor claims, “proved to himself [Lane] that the extermination of the officers 
in question was done by the Soviet authorities.”123 Within the editorial, Kleitman notes that “the 
public at large does not seem convinced that this occurred…hence the appointment of a 
Congressional committee to look into the matter [of Katyń].”124 The exchange of letters between 
Arthur Bliss Lane and Nathaniel Kleitman provide an important glimpse into the many debates 
that political figures and members of American society had about the issue of Katyń during the 
House of Representatives’ investigation. As noted in the previous chapter, Katyń remained a 
source of contention between the German and Soviet governments. Within the United States, the 
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issue of Katyń also remained a source of contention between the Polish embassy, American 
political officials, and American society.  
Following the series of investigations, the House of Representatives’ report concluded 
that the Soviet NKVD was responsible for the “Katyn massacre.” The findings of the report 
brought along more concerns than intended political usages of the Katyn massacre for the United 
States House of Representatives. In the conclusion of the investigation, the committee became 
gravely anxious over the discovery of the State and War Department’s cover-up of the truth, the 
acceptance of the Soviet narrative of “truth” about the massacre, and the perceived abandonment 
of the London Poles by the United States following the Yalta Conference.125 In the end, these 
discoveries would be utilized as a political strategy by the Republicans in an attempt to gain East 
European voters away from Democrats in the 1952 election.126  Though the investigation has 
been viewed as a rather anticlimactic event in the tensions between the United States and Soviet 
Union, the investigation led way to a hospitable environment in which Polish émigré in the 
United States could produce publications, like Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn 
Massacre. 
At the height of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the 
groundbreaking study, Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Massacre by J.K. Zawodny, 
was published by the University of Notre Dame Press in 1962. Scholar George Sanford refers to 
the work as “the best public examination of the Katyn evidence,” until the Soviet documentation 
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of Katyń became available in 1990 and subsequent analyses of these materials by Russian 
scholars, Natalia S. Lebedeva and Vladimir Abarinov were produced.127 While several scholars 
have praised the work for its merit and for its objective focus on the Polish, Soviet, and German 
government evidence, testimonies, and other supporting documents, there has not been 
substantial discussion on Zawodny as a historical actor in the process of memory making of 
Katyń in the Polish émigré community.128  
Born in Poland, Janusz Kazimierz Zawodny was a Polish historian and political scientist. 
During the outbreak of the Second World War, Zawodny was a soldier in the Polish army. On 
September 24, 1939, Zawodny was captured by the Soviet army.  He was set to be deported by 
the NKVD following his capture by Soviet forces. Zawodny escaped through the Soviet-German 
border and returned to Warsaw. During the German occupation of Poland, he fought in the 
Warsaw Uprising of 1944. Following the capitulation of Warsaw on October 5th, 1944, he was 
taken prisoner and interned in a German prison camp. After the liberation of the camp, Zawodny 
joined the Second Polish Army corps, in the military unit led by General Władysław Anders in 
Italy. Following the end of the Second World War and the institution of the Soviet aligned 
government in the PRL, he emigrated to the United States. He received his academic training and 
Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1955.129 
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 Zawodny’s first major publication, Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyń Forest 
Massacre, attempts to reconstruct the “fate” of the thousands of Polish officers murdered in the 
Katyń Forest near Smolensk.130 The author sought to answer the questions:  
1). Who killed these men? 
2). How were they killed? 
3). Why were they killed? 131 
The work is divided into nine chapters, examining the immediate historical context of the 
captured Polish officers grounded in the preconditions to the commencement of the Second 
World War to “problems caused by Katyn” in the 1950s.132 Throughout the monograph, 
Zawodny utilizes and analyzes government documents in an attempt to answer the questions put 
forth by the study. Within the third chapter of the work titled “The Inconvenient Allies — Alive 
and Dead,” Zawodny provides invaluable insight into some of the perceptions that ordinary Poles 
had prior to the “discovery” of the mass graves by German forces and the publications of the 
Katyń lists: 
“When the discovery of the graves in Katyn was announced, I was in Warsaw. It 
was generally believed by the Poles that this was a hoax to drive a wedge between 
the Soviet Union and the other Allies and that Goebbels was wielding the 
hammer. Then the first list of names and the pictures appeared in the daily 
(German-controlled) paper. The name-lists were read in radio broadcasts. The 
Polish delegations returned from Katyn spreading their observations. It was true! 
The Underground community had its own sources at the science for verification—
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they confirmed. The crescendo of German propaganda might as well not have 
existed. The Underground knew for certain that the Polish prisoners-of-war had 
been killed on Soviet territory. But by whom?”133 
 
 The selected quote from Zawodny’s Death in the Forest further elucidates upon the effect 
of the German Nazi propaganda campaign on ordinary Poles living in German occupied Poland 
that was previously examined in the last chapter of this thesis project. Within the final chapter of 
the work, Zawodny examines present problems created by the legacy of Katyń in the 
contemporary PRL. Zawodny analyzes the suppression of the Katyn massacre by the PRL 
government through assassinations, propaganda publications, and relative government 
suppression of the “truth” about the Katyń crime. The work utilizes a wide breath of available 
documentation in the German, Polish, Russian, and English languages that provides significant 
insight into the understandings of Katyń by contemporaries.  In addition to the elucidation upon 
the perceptions held by Poles in response to the discovery of the Katyń, the work also highlights 
an important attribute of the Katyń story that scholars have overlooked: the role of the FRG 
(West Germany). Throughout the study, Zawodny utilized German documentation and archival 
materials from the FRG. In the concluding chapter of the work, Zawodny asserts that the West 
German press does not consider the Katyn case closed. In the FRG, German public opinion 
“does not wish Germany to be blamed for this murder.”134  
As evidenced through a brief examination of the work, the politics of memory played a 
significant role in the publication of Death in the Forest, particularly due to the author’s access 
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to the West German documentary materials. The legacy of Death in the Forest is resounding. In 
present-day studies of the mass executions of the Polish officers, police officers, and members of 
the intelligentsia, Zawodny’s contribution is still heavily utilized. Zawodny’s contribution to the 
historiography demonstrates a dual project of the history and memory makings of Katyń. 
Did the work influence ordinary Poles living within the PRL? While the work left an 
inconsequential impact on the English language speaking communities in the United States and 
Great Britain, it is difficult to postulate whether Death in the Forest made quite the impact as 
Zbrodnia Katyńska did in the PRL. Zbrodnia Katyńska made an invaluable impact on the 
founding memorialization culture of the Powązkowski Cemetery in Warsaw. We will briefly 
analyze the processes and representation of memorialization in the following chapter in locations 
within the PRL, like the Powązkowski Military Cemetery in Warsaw. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: REPRESENTATIONS OF KATYŃ BY POLES LIVING 
WITHIN THE PRL 
 
Introduction 
Representations of Katyń by ordinary Poles living within the PRL was a dangerous 
endeavor to undertake following the institution of a Soviet aligned government in the PRL. In 
official state memory, the perpetrators of the crime were German forces and the crime was 
committed during the German occupation of Smolensk in 1941. Throughout the existence of the 
PRL, there was only one written work legally published on the issue of Katyń. Published in 1952, 
Bolesław Wójcicki’s Prawda o Katyniu (The Truth About Katyń) posited that Katyń was the work 
of German forces during the German occupation of Smolensk in 1941.135 Within Prawda o 
Katyniu, Wójcicki argues against the ongoing United States House of Representatives’ 
investigation on the Katyń as a “violation of the sovereignty of Poland.”136 In its essence, Prawda 
o Katyniu represented the official state’s representation and official memory of Katyń. In private 
and collective memories of ordinary Poles, the official state memory was rejected in many cases.137  
Powązkowski Military Cemetery, Warsaw 
Despite the legal and potentially fatal risks, acts of commemoration and representation did 
occur behind the gates of cemeteries and churches. Until the Solidarność period, public 
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memorialization of Katyń took the form of the sacralization and memorialization of the dead in 
spaces like cemeteries. One of the most well-known locations of the contested memorialization of 
Katyń between the government and ordinary Poles in the PRL is the Powązkowski Military 
Cemetery in Warsaw. The cemetery holds a cultural and political significance to Poles. The 
cemetery holds the graves of many fallen Poles during the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. The main 
site of memorialization to the Katyń victims is the space adjacent to the monument to the wartime 
forces of the Polish underground, Armia Krajowa (AK, hereafter).138 The monument was built in 
1946, containing a black obelisk crowned by a Polish eagle and inscribed with the date 1939-1945 
and the phrase “Gloria Victis” (“Glory to the Vanquished”).139 The circulation of Zbrodnia 
Katynska by the Polish underground in the PRL would make an inconsequential impact on the 
commemoration of the Katyń dead in Warsaw’s Powązkowski Military Cemetery.140 The 
monument in the Powązkowski Cemetery would soon become a place of pilgrimage and 
commemoration to the executed Polish prisoners of war in Katyń and those who were killed during 
the Warsaw Uprising in the late 1940s.141 In the contemporaries’ understanding, Katyń would be 
equated with the loss and mourning experienced in the wake of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. The 
Warsaw Uprising represented an event of significant loss to Poles in the early years of the PRL.  
It is critical to note that throughout the early representations and commemorations of  
Katyń in the Powązkowski Military Cemetery, the focal point of the commemoration was on the 
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memory of the dead, rather than asserting who killed the Polish officers and when through these 
representations. Nevertheless, the commemorations posed a real threat to the government of the 
PRL.142 In 1959 on All Souls’ Day, a wooden cross was placed in the cemetery with the inscription: 
“Symbolic grave of the 12,000 Polish officers murdered in Katyń. They were Poles, and they died 
on foreign soil at the hands of a brutal enemy. They deserve to be remembered and to be 
honored.”143 The wooden cross was removed, and an immediate government backed investigation 
took place. Although the PRL government first suspected the involvement of the AK, the identity 
of the person that erected the cross was soon revealed: Ludwika Dymecka, the wife of executed 
Polish officer Wojciech Dymecki, whose name was mentioned on the Katyń List.144 Prior to the 
confession, Dymecka had been caught distributing pamphlets and leaflets on the site.145 The 
investigative team decided not to pursue charges against Dymecka, due to the “mental illness” that 
she was allegedly suffering from, as determined by PRL officials.146 Throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, other Poles would erect crosses and flowers on the site, building upon Dymecka’s initial 
project. The continued, clandestine memorialization was spread by word of mouth among 
Warsaw’s residents.  
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In addition to the clandestine memorialization and commemoration at the Powązkowski 
Military Cemetery, the memory of the Katyń dead was also constructed and maintained within the 
Katyń families (Rodziny Katyńskie). “Rodziny Katyńskie” refers to the families that lost a family 
member in the series of mass executions that came to be collectively known as “Katyń.” Because 
the Katyń families could not publicly discuss the loss of their family members without fear of legal 
retribution, the memories of their executed family members were often told through stories told in 
the privacy of their homes:  
“Someone recently asked me how old I was when my father decided to tell me 
about my grandfather, who was killed at Katyń. In Communist Poland, people 
were afraid of this knowledge, as a child could show off such a story on the 
playground or at school—and the family would be in real trouble! I didn’t 
understand the question, because there was one thing Dad did not tolerate: fear. I 
always knew that my grandfather was killed by the “Russians” in Katyń—and I 
also always knew that what was said at home with family was not discussed 
outside the house. But in hearing such a question, I understood that beneath it lies 
the greatest drama of contemporary Polish history, a drama of remembrance: that 
there were such homes in which fear did not allow children to be taught the truth. 
Perhaps this is why we, Katyń Families, are able to exist for so many years. We 
simply tell our stories.”147 
 
Ludwika Dymecka, a member of the Katyń families, inspired further clandestine efforts at 
the memorialization site in the Powązkowski Military Cemetery. The representations of 
remembrance and mourning at the Powązkowski Military Cemetery would often coincide with 
significant dates to Poles: the anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising on August 1st, the anniversary 
of the Crime of Katyń, the anniversary of the invasion of Poland by the Soviet Union on September 
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17th, and All Saints Day on November 1st.148 Government officials would soon remove the crosses, 
flowers, and other relics to the memory of the Katyń dead. The site would become known as 
“Dolinka Katyńska—Katyń’s Hollow.” Throughout the existence of the PRL, the commemoration 
of Katyń in the Powązkowski Military Cemetery would become “a war of monuments” between 
the government and ordinary Polish citizens.149 This war of monuments would reach a height 
during the Solidarność period in the early 1980s.  
Solidarność 
 During the mid-1970s, Poland’s economy began to dramatically deteriorate.150 In response 
to the worsening economic conditions and the perceived inefficiency of the government, tensions 
and unrest arose among Polish workers across the country. On June 25th, 1976, the first notable 
widespread strikes erupted across Poland. Workers from at least 130 factories went on strike and 
took to the streets to protest the unexpected, steep price increases of food items across Poland. 
This announced was given by the Polish Sejm the day prior to the strikes.151 Soon, the call for 
action in workers’ protests transitioned from economic concerns to demands for human rights and 
autonomy among Poles living within the PRL. In August 1980, approximately one million workers 
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assembled in factory halls and shipyards demanding human rights and autonomy across the 
PRL.152  
Amid these protests and strikes, one of the most significant movements in modern Polish 
history was born. Following a series of workers’ strikes in response to the termination of Anna 
Walentynowicz at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk, the independent trade union Solidarność 
(Solidarity) was formed out of a series of negotiations between PRL officials and trade union 
workers in 1980.153 The negotiations came in the aftermath of strikes across the country over 
Walentynowicz’s termination, due to her support of trade unions. The termination came just fifty 
days before her scheduled retirement.154 The termination shocked the nation, as Walentynowicz 
represented the many trials that the nation had experienced within the tumultuous twentieth 
century. Walentynowicz was an orphan of the Second World War, a single parent, and a skilled 
crane operator of thirty years in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk. Walentynowicz’s termination was 
based on her political opposition to the PRL government, through her support of trade unions. 
Another unemployed worker at the Lenin Shipyard, Lech Wałęsa, inspired Walentynowicz’s 
coworkers at the Shipyard to strike.155  
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From its inception, Solidarność had “sought to limit itself” to trade union specific issues 
and not partake in national politics. 156 Solidarność was the first and only free trade union 
movement formed in the “Soviet bloc.”157 Solidarność was also the only movement to be legally 
recognized by a communist, Soviet aligned government until the declaration of martial law and 
the subsequent legal dissolution of Solidarność was implemented on December 12, 1981. The 
trade union movement soon began to concern itself with more than just trade union specific 
issues. After one year, over ten million people belonged to Solidarność from across the PRL. 
Solidarność was the largest and “most successful display” of political activism to emerge in 
Soviet aligned countries during the post-war period.158 Solidarność members had created an 
independent press, adult education courses, political clubs, and more in the PRL.159 Even before 
the declaration of martial law, Solidarność became a symbol of anticommunist protest to 
ordinary Poles throughout the country. Thus, it is within this political-economic context that the 
“symbolic war” between the PRL’s government, the Catholic Church, and opposition 
movements like Solidarność occurred.160 One of the most pressing issues and symbols utilized in 
this “war” was Katyń. For Poles living within the PRL, the issue of the Katyń crime transitioned 
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from a war of commemoration and remembrance to a war of protest and symbols used against 
communist government officials during the Solidarność period.  
Katyń in Solidarność Speeches, Publications, and Protests at the Powązkowski 
Military Cemetery  
Throughout the August 1980 strikes at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk, shipyard workers 
were cognizant of the “larger” issues at hand for ordinary Poles living within the PRL.161 Even 
before the trade union movement was legally formed in September 1980, the issue of Katyń 
appeared as a concern to workers on strike in the Lenin Shipyard. The workers behind the August 
1980 strikes demanded for the reinstatement of Anna Walentynowicz and Lech Wałęsa at the 
shipyard, the director’s guarantees of no future reprisals against workers on strike, a pay raise of 
two thousand złoty, and a memorial to the murdered workers who were killed in the December 
1970 protests.162 Amidst a disagreement between the shipyard director and workers over the 
placement and possibility of the memorial, an angry worker responded:  
“We are haggling over dead bodies like blind beggars under the lamp post. You’re 
talking about planning problems….people have been waiting for a monument to 
fifteen thousand Polish soldiers murdered by the Soviet government in Katyń 
thirty years,,,,I beg your pardon forty years….how much longer…”163 
As the strikes evolved, so did the “symbolic dimension” of the strikes. Through symbols, 
ceremonies, and writings, workers were able to express their feelings, emotions, and thoughts 
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surrounding a multitude of political, economic, social, and “existential” issues like Katyń.164 
During the Solidarność period, the crime of Katyń was frequently mentioned throughout 
Solidarność’s publications. In doing so, Solidarność built upon the efforts made by the 
clandestine “Katyń Institute,” by publishing its own editions and translations of Katyń 
documentation previously published outside Poland.165 At Solidarność’s First Congress in 
Gdańsk-Oliwa in September-October 1981, the trade union movement’s “feelings” over Katyń 
emerged on the political, public stage. The First Congress’ building had Katyń memorial posters 
decorating the walls, and materials on the subject for sale.166 The issue was also frequently raised 
in government negotiations and debates between Solidarność and government officials prior to 
the institution of martial law in 1981.167.  
At the height of the Solidarność period, commemorations for the Katyń dead continued at 
the Powązkowski Military Cemetery in Warsaw. On July 31, 1981, Solidarność member Stefan 
Melak led a group of thirty-seven people to Dolinka Katyńska—the contested memorial site for 
the Katyń dead—in the Powązkowski Military Cemetery. Melak had been participating in the 
clandestine memorialization of the Katyń dead at the cemetery for many years. Melak and his 
follows erected a memorial that would be rather difficult for government officials to remove. The 
memorial was a massive stone cross, weighing nearly four tons and measuring at four meters 
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tall.168 With his brother Arkadiusz, Father Wacław Karlowicz, and many others, Melak began the 
construction of the memorial in 1979. The memorial read: “Katyń, Ostaszków, Kozielsk, 
Starobielsk, 1940.”169 The date on the memorial was a radical break from previous 
memorialization of the Katyń dead at the Powązkowski Cemetery. Prior to the erection of this 
memorial, the issue of when the mass executions of the Polish soldiers did not appear in 
memorialization and representations within the cemetery. During the Solidarność period, the 
memorial was erected as a political, protest symbol of remembrance—the date was a severe 
formal accusation of the Soviet culpability of the crime.170 PRL government officials quickly 
dismantled the memorial the following night.  
Four years after the dismantlement and disappearance of the Melak memorial, PRL 
government officials erected their own memorial to the Katyń dead in the Powązkowski 
Cemetery.171 The memorial bore the year “1941” and attributed the deaths of 4,321 Polish 
officers to “Hitlerite fascism.”172 The inscription read: “To the Polish soldiers-victims of the 
Hitlerite fascism that arose on the soil of Katyn.”173 News of the government backed memorial 
spread by word of mouth in Warsaw. The memorial outraged many Warsaw residents over the 
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inscriptions on the memorial, stating that the officers murdered at Katyn were executed by 
German forces. In a New York Times article, one “young engineer” stated that, “It is simply 
shocking to blame Katyn on the Germans when everyone knows who was responsible.”174 The 
“war of monuments” would continue. Immediately following the erection of the government 
backed memorial, Warsaw residents scratched “1940-N.K.V.D.” into the memorial. Alongside 
the memorial, thirty memorial candles flickered. Many Poles held the view that the Katyn dead 
and the rest of the 15,000 Polish officers were murdered by the NKVD. In 1987, protestors 
installed a plaque directly citing the Soviets as responsible for the murders at Katyń. Following 
the collapse of communism within the country in 1989, the Melak memorial was “found” and 
reinstalled at the site in 1995.175 
Katyń as the Test of Glasnost: Representation in Government Debates and the 
Role of Contingency in the Release of the Documents  
On December 12, 1981, General Jaruzelski declared martial law in the PRL. Following 
the institution of martial law, Solidarność was outlawed. Thousands of members of the trade 
union movement, like Lech Wałęsa, were arrested. While Solidarność was illegal within the 
PRL, the trade union movement did not cease its political efforts. The organization simply went 
underground. In the aftermath of the declaration of martial law, seven Solidarność members—
notably all women—helped form the vital, clandestine networks for the trade union movement to 
continue its efforts.176  Following the declaration of martial law and the suppression of 
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Solidarność, homemade banners with the words “Katyń” and “Solidarność” appeared throughout 
Polish cemeteries accompanying candles and memorials.177  
Two years after the declaration was given, martial law would come to an end in Poland. 
Solidarność members, like Wałęsa, were free to return to work.178 Solidarność would largely 
continue to operate underground until glasnost reached Poland in the late 1980s. In 1985, the 
new head of the Soviet communist party, Mikhail Gorbachev, instituted a series of policies 
(perestroika and glasnost) that would have profound effects on the Katyń issue in the PRL.  
Perestroika refers to the policy of restructuring the economic structure of the USSR. Glasnost 
refers to the policy of ‘openness,” restructuring the political system of the USSR as a more 
democratized apparatus. 179 Because of glasnost, media was allowed more literary freedoms. 
This would have profound effects on the release of the Katyń documents and the announcement 
of the Soviet responsibility for the crime of Katyń by Gorbachev in 1990. In addition to the 
institution of glasnost, Gorbachev and General Jaruzelski of the PRL established a joint historical 
commission to investigate “blank spots” in the two countries shared histories, namely over the 
issue of Katyń in 1987.180 
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In Poland, perestroika and glasnost’s effects reached the country slowly. In Struggle and 
Triumph, Lech Wałęsa notes that in 1987, while “perestroika had not yet reached Poland…its 
effects were beginning to be felt, and one of those effects was to offer us a new alternative.”181 
Following the government of the PRL’s announcements of price increases in early 1988, strikes 
broke out across Poland. Throughout the majority of 1988, strikes occurred across the country in 
shipyards, factories, steel yards, and mines. Among the back drop of the strikes in the early 
spring of 1988, Poles learned that Gorbachev was set to visit Poland on July 11, 1988.182 The 
visit would highlight the continued significance of Katyń among Poles. In a United Press 
International newspaper article dated July 10th, 1988, Katyń was listed as the “biggest test of 
glasnost” ahead of Gorbachev’s scheduled visit to Poland in summer 1988. 183 Within the article, 
Polish Cardinal Josef Glemp stated that the “most important problem is Katyń.”184 While 
Gorbachev did not discuss Katyń during his visit to Poland in July 1988, Katyń would soon 
become the test of glasnost for an unlikely adversary against the Soviet Union—the communist 
government of the PRL. 
At the end of 1988 and early 1989, Solidarność leaders engaged in several round table 
talks with PRL government officials. Amidst these round table talks, the PRL’s official state 
newspaper Odrodzenie published documentary evidence on the Katyń crime in February 1989. 
Within the publication, the Polish communist authorities declared that Soviet forces were the 
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perpetrators of the Katyń crime. The report also cited the murders of at least 4,200 Polish officers 
at the hands of Soviet forces.185 The report was the first official state account published 
throughout the entire existence of the PRL that posited Soviet forces were the perpetrators of the 
Katyń crime. The report’s publishing was the true test of glasnost for Poles and the Polish 
government over the issue of Katyń. There was no military, legal, or punitive action taken 
against the Polish government by the Soviet government in response to the report’s publishing.  
The round table discussions between Solidarność and PRL government officials ended 
with an agreement calling for unrestricted elections to 35% of the Polish Sejm, with the rest 
reserved for Soviet aligned Polish communist party members and all of the available seats in the 
Senat. On April 17, 1989, Solidarność was legally reinstated and registered in the PRL.186 In 
June 1989, Solidarność won 99 of the 100 of Senat seats and every available seat in the Sejm.187 
Following the elections, the Polish media increased their pressure for the truth surrounding 
Katyń. 188 In the August 19th, 1989 edition of Polityka, Polish historians recounted the known 
history of the Katyń crime and concluded that the NKVD were the perpetrators of the series of 
mass executions of Polish officers. On October 12th, the Polish press reported that the Polish 
prosecutor general “had requested his Soviet opposite number to conduct an investigation.”189 
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Throughout government negotiations and conversations between the Polish and Soviet 
governments in late 1989 and early 1990, Katyń remained a central issue. 
The events of November 1989 marked the symbolic end of communism in Eastern 
Europe. In political contemporaries’ minds, however, the end of the Soviet Union was not yet a 
reality. In the early months of 1990, negotiations took place between Polish officials and Soviet 
officials over shared diplomatic concerns between the two states. On January 18th, 1990, Soviet 
Ambassador Vladimir Brokikov visited with Lech Wałęsa in Gdańsk. In a conversation between 
the two, Wałęsa noted that the “Communist system, maintained by military might, was slowly 
but surely receding into the past.”190 According to Wałęsa, the key to establishing new relations 
between the governments was to first: 
“fill in the blank pages of Polish-Soviet history: those involving the USSR’s 
attack on Poland on September 17, 1939; the massacres at Katyn Forest and 
elsewhere of fifteen thousands Poles, mostly officers and intellectuals; and the 
deportation of hundreds of thousand of Poles to Siberia for forced labor.”191 
 
On the forty-seventh anniversary of the Radio Berlin’s announcement of the discovery of 
the mass graves at Katyń, the Soviet government announced its responsibility for the mass 
executions of Polish officers in the Katyń Forest on April 13th, 1990. The Soviet government 
officially accepted the blame for murdering over 15,000 Polish officers, who were interned in the 
Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov camps in the Soviet Union between March and June 1940. 
On April 14th, Gorbachev released selected documents to President Jaruzelski, to aid the Polish 
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president, whose position was being challenged by “more liberal forces.”192 Even with the 
release of the “truth,” the announcement still produced great anxiety among Poles, like 
Wałęsa.193 The issue of Katyń was not resolved in the minds of Poles. 
In Polish collective memory and subsequent publications detailing the events of 1990, the 
successful efforts to gain the “truth” about Katyń from Soviet officials are often depicted and 
remembered as a result of the efforts of Solidarność and its leaders, like Lech Wałęsa.194 While 
Solidarność played an inconsequential role in the events of 1989 and the “fall” of communism in 
Poland, it was the collective efforts of Solidarność, Polish officials, and contemporaries living 
within the Soviet Union that led to the release of the documents in 1990. In the Soviet Union, 
historians, scholars, and writers took a strong interest in the issue of Katyń in light of glasnost 
and the establishment of the joint commission to investigate shared “blank spots” in Polish-
Soviet histories. On May 11, 1988, Literaturnaya Gazeta correspondent Vladimir Abarinov 
published an article positing that the NKVD was responsible for the crime, “Blank Spots: From 
Emotions to Fact.”195 The reception of the article was critical; hundreds of editorial replies were 
submitted to the magazine refuting Abarinov’s claims. Throughout the various letter 
submissions, Abarinov received a letter of critical importance: from Alexei Lukin, a member of 
the 136th battalion that was stationed at Kozelsk in 1940. During a search through available 
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records on the 136th battalion, Abarinov found evidence that thousands of Polish officers who 
were held at Kozelsk were sent to Smolensk and never returned.196 
Following the Polish government’s publication on documentation surrounding Katyń in 
February 1989, Soviet officials wrote in a note to the party Central Committee that the time was 
optimal to tell the truth about Katyń. In late March 1989, Russian historians Natalia Lebedeva, 
Yuri Zoria, and Valentina Parsadanova found documents in Soviet archives containing the names 
of Polish officers sent to the internment camps, like Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov.197 
Several Soviet officials advised Gorbachev to release the truth about Katyń to Polish President 
Jaruzelski. Gorbachev remained adamant that he would not do so. Two key factors finally 
pressed Gorbachev and the Politburo to admit Soviet culpability in Katyń in April 1990. In the 
early months of 1990, Polish President Jaruzelski sent an official memorandum stating that if 
Gorbachev would not release the truth surrounding Katyń, he would not proceed with his 
planned presidential visit to Moscow in April.198 The second factor was more pressing and 
ultimately forced Gorbachev’s hand.199 On March 25, 1990, Moskovskie Novosti published 
documents on the 136th battalion compiled by Abarinov, an interview with Lebedeva, and the 
documents found by Lebedeva. The article was titled “The Katyn Tragedy” and it was published 
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without the government’s permission.200,201 Lebedeva recalls the aftermath of the release of the 
documents as having the effect of a “bomb explosion.”202 On April 13th, the Soviet news agency 
TASS declared Soviet responsibility for the disappearances of over 14,000 Polish officers in 
1940. The announcement declared that nearly 15,000 prisoners from the Kozelsk, Ostashkov, 
and Starobelsk prisoner camps had been transferred to the NKVD administrations in Smolensk, 
Voroshilovgrad, and Kalinin oblasts. They would not appear again in any subsequent NKVD 
records. The news agency reported that the documents were given to Polish authorities.203 The 
“truth” surrounding Katyń emerged as a process and the moment was contingent—the pressure 
placed upon Gorbachev by Soviet writers, journalists, and scholars led to the release of the 
documents in April 1990. It is vital to note that some elements of the “truth” surrounding Katyń 
were still shrouded in secrecy at the time of the documents’ release in 1990.  
Following the release of the documents to Jaruzelski and the announcement of Soviet 
responsibility of the crime, there still remained many unanswered questions surrounding the 
crime of Katyń. While the who and when had been answered by Soviet state officials 
surrounding the Katyń crime, there were several documents missing from the collection to 
answer the question: why were the Polish officers murdered? For many ordinary Poles, the 
questions surrounding who killed the Polish officers and when they had been murdered had 
already been answered in the memory making processes of Katyń. In the aftermath of the 
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documents’ release, Poles continued to pressure Gorbachev for more information surrounding 
the mass executions.204 In response, Gorbachev ordered further investigation on Katyń in late 
1990.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 did not negatively affect the Katyń 
investigation. Rather, the collapse of the USSR provided the political conditions that made it 
possible for the release of the most damning document in the possession of the Soviet state over 
Katyń: the March 1940 Politburo order to execute the 21,000+ Polish officers.205 In December 
1991, Gorbachev gave Russian President Boris Yeltsin the documents about Katyń, including the 
1940 Politburo order in a final meeting of the Soviet state. 206 Gorbachev encouraged Yeltsin to 
seriously consider the implications of the release of the documents, because “I am afraid they can 
lead to international complications. However, it is up to you to decide.”207 After reading the 
documents, Yeltsin would not provide the documents to Polish officials for over ten months. In 
January 1992, Polish President Lech Wałęsa wrote to Yeltsin, requesting Polish officials’ access 
to the archives surrounding 1939 and the invasion of Poland by the Soviet Union.208 This request 
would not be granted until the Russian state’s release of the documents ten months later. On 
October 14th, 1992, Chief Russian Archivist Pikhoia delivered the documents, including the 
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March 1940 Politburo execution order, to President Wałęsa in Warsaw under the orders of 
Yeltsin. At the same time, the order was broadcasted on the Russian state news agency ITAR-
TASS.209 The historical “truth” surrounding Katyń as we know it today was learned on October 
14th, 1992.  
In early March 1940, the fate of 21,000+ Polish military and police officers, and various 
members of the intelligentsia was sealed. In a review of the cases of over 21,000+ Polish 
prisoners of war, Josef Stalin ordered the execution of these persons, as “committed and 
incorrigible enemies of Soviet power.”210 High ranking officials of the Soviet state, like Josef 
Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov, signed the order.211 The order set the mass executions in motion. 
Many of the thousands of murdered Polish officers were not always shot at the site of the mass 
graves in places like the Katyń Forest as first believed during the initial exhumations of the site. 
Many officers were shot in an execution room in NKVD dachas and headquarters. About twenty 
percent of the victims had their hands tied behind their back and a rope binding tied from their 
necks to their hands. If the prisoners attempted to move, they would suffocate. Scholars like 
David Satter believe that the prisoners found with their hands tied behind their backs were likely 
shot at the burial sites, particularly marking them as prisoners that had attempted to resist before 
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their execution.212 The prisoners were executed in sites such as the Katyń Forest, the Kalinin and 
Kharkov prisons, and remote sites throughout present-day Ukraine and Belarus.  
Why did Stalin order the mass execution of over 21,000+ Polish prisoners? Since the 
release of the Katyń documents in the early 1990s, the question has been a popular topic of 
inquiry in scholarship produced on Katyń. The answer to this question is not straightforward and, 
in many cases, relies on scholars’ understandings of the perceptions of the Borderlands, Poles, 
and the Polish-Soviet war that Soviet leadership held at the outset of the Second World War. 
Scholar Natalia Lebedeva believes that the decision to shoot these prisoners was a result of the 
Soviet leadership’s initiatives to maintain the security of the Borderlands, the perceived “failure” 
to re-educate the Polish officers on the issue of Polish independence, and the “bitter memory” 
that Stalin held over his suffering in Poland during the Polish-Soviet war.213  
The release of the 1992 documents did not end the continued memory making processes 
of Katyń. Russian and Polish historians came to realize that documentation was still missing 
surrounding Katyń. Blank spots remained in the history of the mass executions of the Polish 
military and members of the intelligentsia. Scholars could not, and still cannot, locate the 
documentation on the death sentences and the execution sites in parts of present day Belarus and 
Ukraine.214 In present-day Poland, Katyń is an integral attribute to national identity making and 
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understandings of suffering in the country. In the concluding portion of this project, I will briefly 
examine representations of Katyń since 1990. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION, WHAT WAS KATYŃ AND WHAT HAS 
IT BEEN SINCE 1990?  
 
What was Katyń? As noted throughout this project, Katyń has come to symbolize a 
myriad of meanings dependent upon the historical actors representing Katyń over time. Since the 
release of the Katyń documents in 1990 and 1992, the memory making processes and tensions 
surrounding Katyń have not ceased. In the aftermath of the documents’ releases in 1990 and 
1992, official reconciliations of memory surrounding Katyń began to take place in public spaces 
throughout the Republic of Poland. The release of the documents and the acknowledgement of 
Soviet culpability allowed public discourse about Katyń to occur in Poland, thus enabling the 
erection of public memorials and an end to the “war of monuments.” Public memorials began to 
mark the memory landscape in cities across Poland. Through these memorials, one can see that 
Katyń has become an integral symbol in the state’s efforts to create national identity from their 
contentious and tumultuous twentieth century past. Following decades of state enforced silence 
surrounding Katyń, Katyń has now become synonymous with national suffering in present-day 
Poland.  
Katyń Memorials: Kraków (1990) and Wadowice (2010) 
Fifty years following the mass executions of Polish officers by the NKVD, a Katyń 
memorial was erected in Kraków, one of Poland’s largest cities, in 1990. The memorial is 
located on ulica Grodzka (Grodzka Street) adjacent to the Wawel Castle.215 The location of the 
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memorial holds significance, as the Wawel Castle is a site of important cultural significance to 
Poles, as well as a major tourist attraction in one of the country’s largest cities.216  The memorial 
is a large cross, with the word “Katyń” between the dates “1940” and “1990,” accompanied by a 
commemorative plaque. The plaque reads: “Kozielsk, Ostashków, Starobielsk,” among other 
Polish cities of cultural and historical significance, such as Poznań, Gdańsk, and Nowa Huta, 
where significant trade union strikes took place during the 1970s and 1980s.217 While the 
location of the memorial is in close proximity to Wawel, the commemoration is primarily 
intended for a Polish audience, as the plaque’s inscription is in the Polish language.  
Located just fifty kilometers from Kraków, there is another significant Katyń memorial in 
Wadowice. Wadowice holds a cultural and religious significance to Poles, as it is the birth place 
of Pope John Paul II. The city is a large tourist attraction in present-day Poland.  The memorial 
to the Katyń dead is located in Plac Solidarnśći (Solidarity Square), located very close to the 
main train station.218 The memorial was erected on April 22, 2010. Similar to the Katyń 
memorial in Kraków, the Wadowice Katyń memorial has the word “Katyń” on the cross. At the 
base of the memorial, there are two hands bound together, lifting up from the ground, 
symbolizing the murdered Polish officers in the Katyń Forest. Behind the cross, there is a list of 
the names of the murdered officers from Wadowice, with a commemorative quote from Pope 
John Paul II. While the audience of the memorial is primarily intended for a Polish audience, the 
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memorial is situated on the path to the city center, making the memorial rather difficult to miss 
by tourists and residents of Wadowice alike. 
It is important to problematize the symbols within the memorials to the Katyń dead in 
places like Kraków and Wadowice, particularly due to the utilization of the cross in the 
memorials. Associated with Christianity and the notion of suffering, the cross holds a myriad of 
significances for Poles. As Jan Kubik argues, the cross in Poland holds a political connotation of 
resistance, a “metaphor of national martyrdom,” and Poland as the “Messiah of nations.”219 The 
memorial represents Katyń as a symbol of national suffering, as “Katyń” appears to be crucified 
on the cross in places like Kraków and Wadowice. The memorial is not wholly inclusive of the 
entirety of the Katyń dead: eight percent of those executed by the NKVD were Jewish, 
Ukrainian, and Belorussian.220  
There also remains differences in the Katyń memorials that show a shift in the 
representation of Katyń in present-day Poland. In the 1990 Kraków memorial, the plaque 
contains an inscription of the names of cultural and historical significant sites of “Soviet 
aggression,” towards ordinary Poles during and following the Second World War.221 As noted by 
Danielle Drozdzewski, the memorial is “intended to reference the years of silence and 
acknowledgement and reinforce the on-going strength of private memory.”222 In the 2010 
                                                          
219 Kubik, The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: the Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State 
Communism in Poland, 189. 
 
220 Drozdzewski, “Knowing (or Not) about Katyń: The Silencing and Surfacing of Public Memory,” 58. 
 
221 Drozdzewski, “Knowing (or Not) about Katyń: The Silencing and Surfacing of Public Memory,” 57. 
 
222 Ibid., 57.  
 
 
 
74 
 
 
Wadowice memorial, the names of the murdered Wadowice officers are listed behind the cross 
with a commemorative quote by Pope John Paul II. In stark contrast from the Kraków memorial, 
the Wadowice memorial highlights the individuals executed in the Katyń Forest. 
Representations, like the Kraków memorial and the Wadowice memorial to the Katyń dead, 
continue to contribute to the memory making processes of Katyń and the making of the national 
narrative of suffering in present-day Poland.223 
Andrzej Wajda’s Katyń and Its Meaning In The 2010 Plane Crash Near 
Smolensk, Russia: A Second Katyń? 
 In 2007, Polish film director Andrzej Wajda released the film Katyń in Poland. Prior to 
the release of the film, there remained no feature length film on Katyń in Poland.224 The project 
held personal significance to Wajda, as his father, Jakub Wajda, was murdered in the Kharkiv 
prison in the series of mass executions that came to be known as Katyń. The film follows a series 
of characters, alternating between narrative focuses on the Katyń families struggling to 
commemorate their dead throughout the early days of the PRL, and the Polish officers in the 
Kozelsk internment camps prior to their executions. The film does not show the mass executions 
of Polish officers until the very end of the film, representing the “blank spot” that Katyń 
represented in Polish collective memory.225 As the Polish officers are being executed, each one 
recites a line of the Lord’s Prayer. The symbolism is significant, as Wajda invokes the idea of 
Polish martyrdom throughout the closing portion of the film. The film was widely and 
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successfully received in Poland. The debut of the film represented an important point in the 
public representation of Katyń in present-day Poland.  
The film’s debut also had reverberating effects in Polish-Russian relations. For the 
seventieth anniversary of the Katyń massacre, a symbolic memorial ceremony was set to occur 
between Polish and Russian officials at the Katyń Forest site in April 2010. Although Wajda’s 
Katyń had been previously banned in Russia, the film was set to be debuted on both minor and 
major public television channels around the commemorations of the anniversary of the Katyń 
crime. The Russian minor television channel, Kul’tura, broadcasted Wajda’s Katyń ahead of the 
joint commemoration on April 2, 2010.226 The President of Poland, Lech Kaczyński, was set to 
lead the ceremony with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. One day following the scheduled 
ceremony, Wajda’s Katyń was set to be broadcasted on one of Russia’s major public television 
channels. 
 On April 10, 2010, new ground emerged within the Katyń memory landscape. In route to 
the joint Katyń memorial between the Russian and Polish governments, Polish President 
Kaczyński’s plane crashed near Smolensk, Russia. Kaczyński and the other occupants on board, 
such as Solidarność member Anna Walentynowicz, were killed instantly in the crash. The 
invocation of Katyń to describe the national tragedy in the aftermath of the plane crash was 
immediate. Former Polish President and Solidarność leader Lech Wałęsa famously referred to 
the crash as the second Katyń.227 The site of the plane crash held deep symbolic meaning to 
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Poles, as the crash happened near the site where the mass graves were first discovered in the 
Katyń Forest.228 Now, Katyń held another meaning to Poles: the site of two national tragedies 
that occurred just seventy years apart from one another. In the aftermath of the crash, Wajda’s 
Katyń was broadcasted on numerous major Russian television channels. Russian President 
Dmitrii Medvedev declared a national day of mourning in Russia to commemorate the plane 
crash—and by extension, the crime of Katyń.229  
Conclusion: Katyń 
The invocation of Katyń in the aftermath of the 2010 Kaczyński plane crash demonstrates 
the central importance that Katyń still holds in the politics of memory in present-day Poland. 
More than seventy years following the mass executions of over twenty thousand Polish officers 
and members of the intelligentsia occurred, the symbolic meaning of Katyń continues as a 
process in the political, memory landscape of present-day Poland. From the commencement of 
the mass executions throughout remote sites in the Soviet Union, Katyń has represented a myriad 
of meanings in the collective memories of states and society throughout time. The understanding, 
representations, “truth,” and narratives surrounding Katyń have undoubtedly been influenced by 
the politics of memory at every stage of the Katyń story. 
In 1943, the “discovery” of the mass graves in the Katyń Forest commenced a period of 
contention between the German, Soviet, and the exiled Polish governments over the identity of 
the forces that executed the 21,000+ Polish military, police officer, and members of the 
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intelligentsia.  Between the German and Soviet governments, Katyń became a political 
bargaining tool of propaganda against the enemy during the Second World War and the 
immediate post-war period throughout the Nuremberg Trials. The German and Soviet 
governments blamed one another for the crime through a series of communique issued 
throughout the early part of 1943. For nearly five decades, the identity of the perpetrators of the 
execution of the Polish officers was a contested issue between the official state memory and 
narrative of the crime, and the collective memories of Polish émigrés and Poles living within the 
PRL. 
For ordinary Poles living within the PRL and for the Polish émigrés living within the 
United States and Great Britain, Katyń came to symbolize a myriad meanings from the Nazi 
“discovery” of the mass graves in the Katyń Forest in April 1943 to a symbol of protest prior to 
the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Though the aims of Goebbels’ 
Katyń propaganda campaign of a united Polish-German front against the Soviet Union were not 
effective in Poland, the propaganda campaign’s language, documentation, and representations of 
Katyń made a lasting impact on the memory making processes of Katyń throughout Polish 
diasporic communities and Poland. Within contributions made to the historical understanding of 
Katyń by Polish émigrés, like Władysław Anders and J.K. Zawodny, we see that the act of 
writing history is a dual project of history and memory making. Émigrés’ contributions, like 
Zbrodnia Katyńska, were smuggled into the PRL by the Polish underground in a clandestine 
effort to expose the “truth” of Katyń in Polish society. In locations, like the Powązkowski 
Military Cemetery in Warsaw, a “war of monuments” occurred between Poles and the 
government over the Katyń dead. During the Solidarność period, Katyń became a symbol of 
 
 
78 
 
 
protest utilized by movements like Solidarność against the communist backed government of the 
PRL.  
Following the release of the Katyń documents in 1990 and 1992, Katyń has continued to 
be a significant symbol in the memory landscape of present-day Poland. Memorials to the Katyń 
dead were erected in cities across Poland, like Wadowice and Kraków. Katyń has been the 
subject of many works of literature, art, and films in Poland, like Andrzej Wajda’s Katyń. In the 
aftermath of the 2010 plane crash near Smolensk, Katyń came to symbolize two national 
tragedies to the Polish nation. Over seventy years following the mass executions of the 21,000+ 
Polish military and members of the intelligentsia throughout the Soviet Union, Katyń continues 
to serve as a representation of national suffering, loss, and anxiety in Polish collective memories. 
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Figure 1: Katyń Memorial, Kraków, Polska. Photograph taken by Amanda Nicole 
Alarcon, July 2017. 
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Figure 2: Katyń Memorial, Kraków, Polska. Photograph taken by Amanda Nicole 
Alarcon, July 2017. 
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Figure 3: Katyń Memorial, Wadowice, Polska. Photograph taken by Amanda Nicole 
Alarcon, July 2017.  
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